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CHAPTER I
ESSAY 1: THE ROLE OF STOCK MARKETS AND BANKS IN
ECONOMIC GROWTH: A SYSTEM APPROACH
I.1 INTRODUCTION
A substantial body of the theoretical literature on finance-growth nexus underlines that better
functioning financial system improves the allocation of resources and hence promotes economic
growth by mitigating the effects of information asymmetry and transaction cost (Bencivenga &
Smith, 1991; Bencivenga, Smith, & Starr, 1995; Bertocco, 2008; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990;
Khan, 2001; King & Levine, 1993a; and Morales, 2003). However, some of the earlier studies
contend that financial sector develops merely in response to economic growth (Robinson, 1952) or
has no significant contribution to growth (Lucas, 1988)1. At the same time, an extensive body
of the literature debates the comparative importance of banks and securities markets in economic
activity. Some argue that banks are relatively better at reducing market frictions associated with
the mobilization and allocation of resources toward more productive activities (Allen & Gale, 1997;
Bhide, 1993; Boot & Thakor, 1997; Coval & Thakor, 2005; Diamond, 1984; Stiglitz, 1985; Stulz,
2000, among others). Others, including Allen and Gale (1999), Boyd and Smith (1998), Holmstrom
and Tirole (1993) contend that well-functioning markets are better at reducing information and
transaction costs and fostering economic growth. Still others emphasize that the focus should be
on creating well-functioning banks and markets rather than on making a choice between the two
as they are not only competing sources of financing but also complementary (Allen & Gale, 2000;
1Levine (1997, 2005) and Beck (2011, 2013) provide thorough review of the literature.
1
Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997; Levine, 1997; Merton & Bodie, 1995; Song and Thakor, 2012, to name
but a few).
Theory also stresses that the relative merits of banks and markets evolve over time and varies at dif-
ferent levels of economic growth of countries. As countries grow economically the services provided
by securities markets become relatively more important and countries become more market-based
(Boot & Thakor, 1997; Boyd & Smith, 1998; Song & Thakor, 2012). These theories imply that the
services provided by banks have a significant contribution to the process of economic growth at the
early stages of development.
Lin (2009), for instance, argues that stock markets positively influence economic growth only when
a country becomes more advanced and is dominated by large capital-intensive industries. He further
argues, based on the experience of now developed countries, that developing countries- particularly
those in the early stages of development-should focus on making small local banks the major source
of financial services and resist any temptations to expand stock markets until later periods when
their economies boost large-scale industrial firms.2 Singh and Weisse (1998) also argue that stock
markets are unlikely to spur long-term economic growth in developing countries as they encourage
short-term profits and also require sophisticated monitoring system to function effectively. Banks,
on the other hand, nurture long-term relationship with investors and hence provide stable source
of finance for achieving long-term economic growth and industrialization.
Empirical evidence concerning the roles of banks and stock markets in economic growth is also
inconclusive and lacks robustness. Many cross-country and panel data studies mainly assess the
roles of banks, without also including stock markets, in boosting economic growth (Beck, Levine,
& Loayza, 2000; Bordo & Rousseau, 2012; De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995; Deidda & Fattouh, 2002;
Favara, 2003; King & Levine, 1993a, b; Levine, Loayza, & Beck, 2000; Loayza & Ranciere, 2006;
Rioja & Valev, 2004; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2002; among others).
2Justin Lin, the chief economist at the World Bank, presents his case in a guest article titled Walk, don’t run
published in The Economist on July 11, 2009.
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In the absence of control for stock markets, it is difficult to assess if financial intermediaries and
markets have independent effects on growth and if the relationship between financial intermedi-
aries and growth still holds after controlling for stock market development. A number of empirical
works, including but not limited to Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2012); Beck and Levine (2004);
Deidda and Fattouh (2008); Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2013); Levine and Zervos (1998);
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000, 2011); and Saci, Giorgioni, and Holden (2009) attempt to overcome
this shortcoming by simultaneously examining the causal effects of stock markets and banks on
growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) provide evidence showing that banking and stock market de-
velopment independently influence economic growth. They, however, employ cross-country OLS,
which neither accounts for potential simultaneity bias nor for country fixed effects. Rousseau and
wachtel (2000) employ difference GMM, which is known to suffer from weak instrument and hence
exhibit biased finite sample properties. They also use annual data that is susceptible to business
cycle influence.
Beck and Levine (2004) significantly improve the statistical and conceptual weaknesses of previous
studies. Using a system GMM for panel data and data averaged over five- year periods (to reduce
potential business cycle effects), they show that banks and stock markets exert strong, independent
positive effects on economic growth. They also properly deflate the financial development and GDP
measures to avoid stock-flow problems in their measurement, which could distort results particu-
larly in high-inflation countries. However, they pool together developed and developing countries
and assess the causal effects of banks and markets on growth in one pass. This may not be very
informative as it is likely that financial intermediaries and markets may have quite different impacts
on growth depending on the stage of economic development of a country.
Deidda and Fattouh (2008), besides pooling together countries at different stages of economic
growth, rely on value of the variables averaged over the entire study period, which might represent
loss of information and may not show the dynamic relationship between financial measures and
economic growth. Saci et al. (2009), although they apply panel GMM to annual data for a group
of developing countries, use one-step estimator, which assumes homoscedastic errors, and is asymp-
totically inefficient relative to the two-step estimator. Besides, the fact that they do not include
3
the control variables in the growth equation and only use them as instruments runs against the
theoretical prediction that the control variables have independent effects on growth.
Two recent papers that show the weakening effect of financial deepening on economic growth are
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) and Arcand et al. (2012). The former demonstrate that the pos-
itive and significant impact of financial deepening on growth for 1960-1989 is vanishing in recent
periods (1990-2004). Arcand et al. (2012) also show that at intermediate level financial deepening
(measured by private credit to GDP ratio) promotes growth, but beyond a given threshold very
high levels of credit are associated with less growth. However, both studies do not show explicitly
if stock markets have any independent role. Rousseau and Wachtel use the sum of M3 and stock
market capitalization to GDP ratios as a broad measure of finance and it is not clear why they
fail to control for both measures separately. Arcand et al., on the other hand, mention that their
finding is robust to the inclusion of stock market turnover ratio, but do not show it in the paper.
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) based on a quantile regression argue that although both banks and
stock markets are positively associated with economic growth, their importance evolves with stages
of economic growth. However, the study does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship between
the stock markets and banks and economic growth.
Against this backdrop, this study attempts to re-examine the association between stock markets
and banks and economic growth for both developed and developing countries using the most recent
available dataset and system GMM for panel data estimation. The closest study to ours is Beck
and Levine (2004). But, this study differs in four ways: (1) it employs the most recent dataset to
a group of 64 countries for the period 1989-2012. Beck and Levine use data on 40 countries from
1976-1998; (2) it assesses the association between stock markets and banks and economic growth
for both high-income (HICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) separately to see if the roles
of markets and banks differ based on the different stages of growth of countries.Panel regressions
that do not address the heterogeneity in the cross-sectional units may mask the likely differen-
tial effects of the financial development that emanate from differences in the stages of growth of
countries, among other factors. That is, panel regression results that are based on pooled hetero-
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geneous cross-country observations may have limited policy relevance. We attempt to attenuate
this problem by sorting out our data into a relatively more homogeneous country subgroups in
our regressions; (3) it employs recent improvements to system GMM (Windmeijer small-sample
correction to variance-covariance matrix of system GMM estimator) that is shown to overcome
the instrument over-fitting problem and significantly reduce the potential biases in small samples
(Windmeijer, 2005); (4) it applies iterative traditional GMM to a system of growth equations, one
for each country, to assess if the panel GMM results hold not only for the two income groups, but
also for the relatively more homogeneous sub-groups of them: Upper-and Lower- MICs and Euro-
pean and Non-European HICs. Theoretically, the iterative traditional GMM applied to relatively
homogeneous countries produces more efficient estimates than the two-step panel GMM as it uti-
lizes more information in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals; it also continuously updates
the estimates until some sort of converge is achieved and this can help remedy the shortcoming of
one- and two-step GMM estimators, where different initial values and weighting matrices will lead
to different point estimates. Besides, it is more flexible than the panel GMM, which is better suited
to short but wide panels (panels with small T and large N),and hence can help us handle smaller
and more homogeneous country groups to derive a more policy relevant conclusion.
Both the dynamic panel GMM and iterative traditional GMM regression results show that while
bank credits and stock market liquidity (marginally) have a robust and strong impact on economic
growth of MICs, the same cannot be said of their effect on growth of the HICs. The regression
results imply that bank credits are strong determinants of economic growth of both Upper- and
Lower-MICs; however, the stock market liquidity exerts a robust influence on economic growth of
only Upper-MICs. The bank credit is found to be not robust and the stock market liquidity is only
marginally significant in the case of Non-European HICs. For European HICs, the stock market
liquidity is found to be not a strong determinant of growth, although bank credit is.
The fact that stock market measures are overall statistically not significant for HICs, except that
they are marginally significant for Non-European HICs, is somewhat surprising as stock markets are
regarded as having comparative advantage over banks in raising funds for innovative and high-tech
investments that characterize these countries.
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For MICs, the lower-MICs in particular, the insignificant coefficient estimates of stock market mea-
sures perhaps imply that the already established stock markets may have not yet reached some
minimum size and activity level beyond which they robustly influence economic growth, or that
lack of transparency in the stock market may lead to poor performance (Jin and Meyers, 2006),
or that the banking system, by establishing and nurturing a long-run personal relationship with
investors may have continued to be the major source of financial services in these countries.
The finding that for lower-MICs the banking system measures are statistically significant but the
stock markets are generally not lends credence to the argument put forward by Singh & Weisse
(1998) and Lin (2009) that developing countries should focus on making the banking sector the
primary source of their financial services rather than diverting scarce resources to the promotion of
sophisticated financial institutions, like stock markets, which not only rely on more sophisticated
monitoring and infrastructure but also encourage short-term profits.
Our finding of lack of robust growth effect of financial sector, especially for HICs, is in line with
recent cross-country and panel studies that also conclude that the effect of financial deepening on
economic growth is vanishing since 1990s (Rousseau and Watchel, 2011); the prevalence of excess
bank credit -credit boom-in many developed countries is dampening economic growth (Arcand et
al., 2012); and there is no clear evidence that finance spurs growth, although the correlation be-
tween the two is well-established (Favara, 2003).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents literature review, while Section
3 provides information on the data and measurement. Section 4 discusses the methodology and
results, and is followed by Section 5 that concludes the paper.
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I.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on finance-growth nexus traces the argument that finance spurs economic growth
in the early works of Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1934) and the later works of Goldsmith
(1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) who formally developed and expanded the argument.
Economic theory shows that well-functioning financial systems, by reducing information and trans-
action costs, facilitate better allocation of resources and thus spur growth (Bencivenga & Smith,
1991; Bencivenga et al., 1995; Bertocco, 2008; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Khan, 2001; King
& Levine, 1993a; and Morales, 2003). Levine (2005) decomposes this primary function of finan-
cial systems- enhancement of resource allocation by mitigating market frictions- into five basic
functions: production of ex ante information about investment opportunities that leads to im-
provement in capital allocation, ex post monitoring and implementation of corporate governance
that will increase investors’ willingness to finance new projects, facilitation of risk management and
diversification, mobilization and pooling of savings, and facilitation of exchange of goods and ser-
vices by providing payment services and thus reducing transaction costs. Financial systems provide
these functions, which through promotion of technological innovation, productivity growth, and/or
capital accumulation ultimately foster long-run economic growth. According to Stiglitz (1994),
financial markets can be thought of as the “brain” of the entire economic system as they primarily
involve the allocation of resources.
There are, however, some economists who contend that financial sector develops merely in response
to demand for certain financial services created by economic development (Robinson, 1952) or that
financial factors have no significant contribution to economic growth (Lucas, 1988).
At the same time, an extensive body of the literature debates the comparative importance of banks
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and securities market in economic activity. Some models argue that banks are relatively better
at screening borrowers, ameliorating moral hazard issue, sharing intertemporal risk, and financing
standardized, well-collateralized and relatively low-risk ventures (Allen & Gale, 1997; Bhide, 1993;
Boot & Thakor, 1997; Chakraborty & Ray, 2006; Coval & Thakor, 2005; Diamond, 1984; Stiglitz,
1985; Stulz, 2000; among others). Others, including Allen and Gale (1999), Boyd and Smith (1998),
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), and Levine (1991) highlight that well-functioning markets enhance
growth by providing better cross-sectional risk sharing, easing transfer of ownership without dis-
rupting production process, providing customized financial arrangements and fostering incentives
for innovative and high-risk projects that often rely on intangible inputs and reducing the inherent
inefficiencies associated with banks. Still others emphasize that the focus should be on creating
well-functioning banks and markets rather than on making a choice between the two as they are
not only competing sources of financing but also complementary (Allen & Gale, 2000; Holmstrom
& Tirole, 1997; Merton & Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997; Song & Thakor, 2012, to name but a few).
Theory also stresses that the relative merits of banks and markets evolve over time and varies at dif-
ferent levels of economic growth of countries. As countries grow economically the services provided
by securities markets become relatively more important and countries become more market-based
(Boot & Thakor, 2000; Boyd & Smith, 1998; Song & Thakor, 2012). These theories imply that the
services provided by banks have a significant contribution to the process of economic growth at the
early stages of development. Singh and Weisse (1998), for example, argue that developing countries,
given that they are more prone to internal and external shocks, should focus on strengthening their
banking systems rather than promoting stock markets. The authors emphasize that stock markets
are unlikely to spur long-term economic growth in developing countries as they encourage short-
term profits and also require sophisticated monitoring system to function effectively. Banks, on
the other hand, nurture long-term relationship with investors and hence provide stable source of
finance for achieving long-term economic growth and industrialization.
Although a growing number of studies attempt to investigate the association between financial
development and economic growth, the empirical evidence concerning the roles of banks and stock
markets in the process of economic growth is mixed and inconclusive.
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On the one hand, many studies solely assess the impact of the development of banks on economic
growth without also assessing the roles of stock market development. King and Levine (1993a),
using OLS cross-country regressions and data on 80 countries over the period 1960-1989, show that
there is a positive relationship between the levels of financial indicators (M3/GDP) and economic
growth and that the current level of financial development is a good predictor of future rates of
economic growth. King and Levine (1993b) extends the earlier work and also uses case studies
and firm-level evidence to show that financial liberalization tends to promote the funding of more
efficient firms and growth of an economy. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), utilizing simple cross-
country growth regressions on a sample of 98 countries during 1960-1985, find that financial depth
(measured by private credit to GDP ratio) has a positive effect on long-term growth of real per
capita GDP. They also find that the effect is stronger in the 1960s than in the 1970s and 1980s
and in middle- and low-income countries than in high-income countries. However, when they re-
strict the dataset to only 12 Latin American countries for 1950-1985, they find significant negative
correlation between financial depth and growth. They posit that this latter finding is due to the
financial liberalization that took place in the region in the 1970s and 1980s in the absence of well-
developed regulatory infrastructure. However, the authors- King and Levine and De Gregorio and
Guidotti-do not prove that financial development causes growth. Levine et al. (2000) and Beck
et al. (2000), both employing pure cross-country instrumental variables regression -on data for 71
and 63 countries- where the country’s legal origin is used as instrument for financial development,
and dynamic panel techniques (on a panel of 74 and 77 countries), respectively, for the 1960-1995
period, conclude that there is a strong, positive link between financial intermediary development
(measured by liquid liabilities, private credit, and commercial bank asset as a ratio of all bank
asset) and economic growth. They also provide evidence in support of a causal link going from
financial development to economic growth. Beck et al. (2000) also show that the link between
financial depth and economic growth goes through productivity growth and not through factor
accumulation. Deidda and Fattouh (2002), applying a threshold regression model to King and
Levine’s (1993a) dataset, find that while in low income countries there is no significant relationship
between financial intermediary development and growth, in high income countries the relationship
is positive and strongly significant. Rousseau and Wachtel (2002),using panel regressions and data
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for 84 countries for 1960- 1995, conclude that there is inflation threshold for finance to positively
influence economic growth and once inflation exceeds the threshold, finance(proxied by M3/GDP,
M3-M1/GDP, and total credit/GDP) no more affects growth. Favara (2003), for a sample of 85
countries over the period 1960-1998, use cross-country instrumental variables and one step gen-
eralized method of moments estimations and conclude that the effect of financial development
(liquid liabilities and private credit) on economic growth is insignificant. But, the evidence from
the non-parametric approach shows that financial sector exerts positive effect on growth only at
intermediate levels of financial development. From another study, Rioja and Valev (2004), based on
generalized method of moments estimation applied to data from 74 countries spanning the period
1960-1995, conclude that financial development (measured by same indicators as in Beck et al.,
2000) exerts positive and significant influence on economic growth only at intermediate level of
financial development and at low level, its effect on growth is mixed. Loayza and Ranciere (2006),
using a panel error correction model on annual data from 75 countries over the period 1960-2000,
conclude that over the long-run financial development supports and promotes economic growth but
in the short-run it may negatively affect growth mainly due to financial crises. Bordo and Rousseau
(2012), applying a set of cross country and dynamic panel data models to a historical data (1880-
2004) for 17 countries, show that financial development affects growth positively throughout the
study period. Other studies with evidence of a positive effect of financial development on overall
economic performance include Benhabib and Spiegel (2000), McCaig and Stengos (2005), Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria (2007), and Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere, and Rogoff (2009).
Some of the time-series studies that document a positive impact of financial intermediary devel-
opment on economic growth include Calderon and Liu (2003); Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004);
Dawson (2010); Hassan, Sanchez, and Yu (2011); Luintel and Khan (1999); and Xu (2000). Other
time-series studies with weak or negative support for the hypothesis that financial development
influences economic growth include Demetriades and Hussien (1996); Kar, Nazlioglu, and Agir
(2011); and Shan (2005).
Although the recent studies have used better estimation techniques, all these studies solely rely
on measures of financial intermediaries and fail to include the measures of stock market develop-
10
ment when investigating the effect of financial development on economic growth. In the absence
of control for stock markets, it is difficult to assess if financial intermediaries and markets have
independent effects on growth and if the relationship between financial intermediaries and growth
still holds after controlling for stock market development.
A number of empirical works, including but not limited to Levine and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and
Wachtel (2000), Beck and Levine (2004), Deidda and Fattouh (2008), Saci et al. (2009), Rousseau
and Wachtel (2011), Arcand et al. (2012), and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) attempt to overcome
this shortcoming by simultaneously examining the causal effects of stock markets and banks on
growth. Levine and Zervos (1998), employing least-squares regression and data on 47 countries
from 1976-1993, demonstrate that the stock market liquidity (measured by value of stock trading
relative to the size of the market) and banking development (measured by bank credit to private
sector as share of GDP) in 1976 are positively and strongly correlated with both the current and
future rates of economic growth, even after controlling for other factors that are associated with
growth. They also conclude that stock markets provide different financial services from banks.
They, however, employ cross-country OLS, which neither accounts for potential simultaneity bias
nor for country fixed effects. Besides, they use only initial values, rather than contemporaneous
values, of stock market and bank development when assessing the association between economic
growth and both stock market and banking development. The use of initial values, however,
does not capture the dynamic interaction between financial development and economic growth.
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) combine a panel vector autoregression with difference generalized-
method-of-moments techniques to examine the effects of stock markets (measured by stock market
capitalization and value traded, deflated by price index of national stock exchange, to GDP ratios)
and financial intermediation (M3/GDP) on economic growth. The regression estimates for a set of
47 countries with annual data for 1980-1995 show that both stock market liquidity and bank devel-
opment exert strong positive effect on economic growth. Although Rousseau and Wachtel employ
a panel estimation technique that controls for simultaneity bias and unobserved country-specific
effects, the difference GMM is shown to suffer from weak instrument and hence biased finite sample
properties. They also use annual data that is susceptible to business cycle influence. Beck and
Levine (2004) significantly improve the statistical and conceptual weaknesses of previous studies.
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Utilizing GMM for panel data estimation, which significantly minimizes the potential biases due to
endogeneity and simultaneity of variables, and a panel of 40 countries over the period 1976 to 1998,
they show that banks and stock markets exert strong, independent positive effects on economic
growth. They use data averaged over five- year periods to reduce potential business cycle effects
and also properly deflate the financial development (are measured at the end-of-period and thus
deflated by end-of-period price deflators) and GDP measures (are flow variables measured over the
whole period and thus deflated by the deflator for the whole period) to avoid stock-flow problems
in their measurement, which could distort results particularly in high-inflation countries. However,
they pool together developed and developing countries and assess the causal effects of banks and
markets on growth in one pass. This may not be very informative as it is likely that financial
intermediaries and markets may have quite different impacts on growth depending on the stage of
economic development of a country.
Deidda and Fattouh (2008), utilizing cross country data set with OLS (71 observations) and instru-
mental variables (about 40 observations) regressions, where the instruments for financial develop-
ment are legal origin of a country, creditor rights index, shareholder rights index, and accounting
standards, attempt to examine the effect of financial intermediaries on long-term economic growth
in the presence of expanding stock markets. They use the average value of the major variables-
growth rate of real per capita GDP, bank credit to the private sector, and stock market turnover
ratio-over the period 1980-1995 with control for other major determinants of growth. Their findings
show that both banks and financial markets positively affect long-term real per capita GDP growth.
However, the interaction term between banks and stock market measures shows that at higher lev-
els of stock market development, the contribution of bank development becomes less positive. Like
Beck and Levine (2004), Deidda and Fattouh pool together countries at different stages of economic
development in their estimation. They also take average of the variables over the study period,
which might represent loss of information and may not show the dynamic relationship between
the variables of interest. Besides, the cross-country instrumental variables regression they use can
control for the potential reverse causality from growth to financial development, but it does not
control for the unobserved country-specific effects from biasing the outcomes.
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Saci et al. (2009), employing one-step generalized- method- of- moments estimator on annual data
from 30 developing countries over the period 1988-2001, analyze the joint contribution of stock
market and banks development to economic growth. They find that while stock market variables
(market turnover ratio and total value traded to GDP ratio) have positive and significant effect
on growth, in their presence the financial intermediary variables (credit to the private sector and
liquid liabilities) have insignificant or even negative effect on growth. The authors, however, do not
include the control variables in the growth equation and only use them as instruments to correct
problems of simultaneity and endogeneity of the explanatory variables. This runs against the theo-
retical prediction that the control variables can have independent effects on economic growth. The
authors also use annual data and do not attempt to minimize the potential effects of business cycle
phenomena from masking the proper relationship between stock markets and bank development
and long-term economic growth. Moreover, the one-step GMM estimator assumes homoscedastic
errors and is asymptotically inefficient relative to the two-step estimator, even if the homoscedastic-
ity assumption holds (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998). There is also no indication
that the authors try to reduce the instrument count that could potentially bias the coefficient es-
timates of dynamic panel GMM.
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011), using both pure cross-sectional and dynamic panel regression tech-
niques with data for 84 countries during the period 1960-2004, demonstrate that the positive and
significant impact of financial deepening on growth for 1960-1989, the same period covered in King
and Levine (1993) and previous cross-country studies, is weakening in recent periods (1990-2004).
Utilizing pure cross-sectional instrumental variable technique, where initial values of finance and
control variables are used as instruments, they further test if the vanishing effect of financial deep-
ening in recent period is due to financial crises, or financial liberalization, or the expansion of equity
market in the same period. Their estimations suggest that the increased incidence of financial crises
during the same period, which often is associated with excessive deepening, might be the major
reason. The authors’ effort is commendable in that they attempt to identify both the causal re-
lationship between financial deepening and growth and the major factor deriving the relationship.
However, they do not control for stock market development when they assess the causal effect of
deepening on growth. The only time they include measure of stock market development in their
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regression is when they test if expansion of stock markets is leading to the vanishing relationship
between deepening and growth. Even then, they use sum of M3 and stock market capitalization
to GDP ratio, when data is available, as broad measure of finance and it is not clear why they use
this gross measure rather than including both measures of financial deepening and stock market
development separately in the regressions. Besides, the pure cross-sectional instrumental variable
technique they employ does not address the potential bias due to country-specific effects and en-
dogeneity of financial measures.
Arcand et al. (2012), utilizing simple cross-sectional, panel and semi-parametric estimators and
both country-level and industry-level data for different sub-periods of 1960-2010, demonstrate that
at intermediate level financial deepening promotes growth, but beyond a given threshold, very high
levels of financial deepening (measured by private credit to GDP ratio) are associated with less
growth.
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013), utilizing quantile regressions on data from more than 69 countries
for the period 1980-2008, demonstrate that although both stock markets and banks are positively
associated with economic growth, the role of markets increases significantly while that of banks
diminishes as economies grow. They conclude, hence, that the importance of banks and markets
evolve with economic growth. The study further highlights the weakness of those studies that
pool together countries at different stage of development when investigating the roles of stock mar-
ket and bank development in economic growth. However, the quantile regression it employs does
not necessarily indicate a causal relationship between the stock markets and banks and economic
growth.
Some related studies with evidence of positive effect of financial intermediaries and stock markets
on overall economic performance include Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) and Rousseau and
Sylla (2005). Some of the works that present positive effects of finance on growth using firm and
industry level data from different countries include Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998); Ilyina
and Samaniego (2012); and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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In a nutshell, despite extensive evidence, some of which is presented above, the empirical literature
on the roles of stock market and bank development in economic growth is far from reaching a
consensus.
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I.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
I.3.1 The Data
To assess the relationship between economic growth and both stock market and banking system
development, we use a panel of 64 Countries for which we have stock market data for the period
1989-2012. The countries are divided into two, following the World Bank’s income classification
system, as High-income (31) and Middle-income (33) countries. The high-income countries (HICs)
include both European and Non-European countries where as the Middle-income countries (MICs)
are composed of upper and lower middle income countries. It is a common practice in the panel
studies of the finance-growth relationship to rely on less frequent data set to minimize the effects
of business cycle fluctuations from masking the true long-run relationship between growth and fi-
nancial development. Taking into account the time dimension of the data and also to allow easy
comparison with existing literature, the data are averaged over five-year and three-year non over-
lapping periods, data permitting. Annual data is also used for sensitivity analysis. The source of
the financial system indicators is the World Bank’s “Financial Structure and Development Data
Base”3 whereas all the control variables, with the exception of schooling which is from Barro &
Lee’s (2010) data base, are from the electronic version of World Bank’s World Development Indi-
cators.
I.3.1.1 Financial system indicators
Well-functioning financial systems mitigate market frictions and spur economic growth through
provision of information about investment opportunities, monitoring of investments, diversification
3Whenever available, the financial system indicators are updated using the original sources: Standard & Poor’s
Emerging Stock Markets/ Global Stock Markets Factbook for stock market measures, and IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics Yearbook for banking system measures.
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and sharing of risks, pooling and mobilization of savings, and facilitation of exchange of goods
and services. However, there is no one best indicator that shows the extent to which banks and
stock markets provide these services across a number of countries. As a result, we rely on multiple
standard measures of the size and activity of banks and stock markets.
To measure stock market development, we use three measures: TURNOVER RATIO, VALUE
TRADED, and MARKET CAPITALIZATION. TURNOVER RATIO equals the value of the traded
shares in domestic stock market divided by total value of listed shares, and it measures liquidity of
the stock market relative to its size. TRADED VALUE equals the value of all (domestic) shares
traded in the (domestic) stock market divided by GDP, and it measures how active the stock mar-
ket is relative to the size of the economy. MARKET CAPITALIZATION equals the total value of
listed shares in the stock market divided by GDP, and it measures the size of the market relative
to the economy. Theory predicts that more liquid/active markets facilitate efficient allocation of
resources and foster growth.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the indicators. As we can see, there is a huge cross-country
variation in these measures. For instance, the turnover ratio averages about 53% (72% in HICs
and 34% in MICs), where Swaziland had the minimum value of 0.02% in 2004-2008 and Pakistan
had the maximum value of 377% in 1999-2003. The traded value also varies from a minimum of
0.002% in Swaziland in 2004-2008 to a maximum of 621% in Hong Kong in 2009-2012, with the
average equal to 38% for the full sample (62% in HICs and 15% in MICs). The average size of the
stock market is about 58% of GDP (79% in HICs and 38% in MICs). In general, the HICs have the
largest and most active stock markets while the lower MICs have the least active markets, relative
to the total sample.
To measure banking system development, we use BANK CREDIT, PRIVATE CREDIT, and LIQ-
UID LIABILITIES. BANK CREDIT equals total credit extended by deposit money banks to the
private sector as a share of GDP. It excludes credits by other financial institutions and to the
government and public enterprises. PRIVATE CREDIT equals credit issued by deposit banks and
other financial institutions (excluding central banks) to the private sector divided by GDP. These
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two measures were almost identical until the late 1990s but they started diverging at the beginning
of the new millennium (Arcand et al. 2012). Higher levels of each could represent higher levels of
financial services to the private sector and thus greater financial intermediary development. How-
ever, it could also show over-lending, which could deter growth.
LIQUID LIABILITIES equals the ratio of liquid liabilities of financial system (currency plus de-
mand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial institutions) to GDP or the ratio
of broad money to GDP (M3/GDP). It measures the overall size of the financial intermediary sec-
tor. This measure is commonly used in the literature under the assumption that the size of the
sector is directly correlated with the financial services it renders. However, it does not necessarily
measure the degree to which financial institutions overcome the adverse effects of information asym-
metry and transaction costs and provide effective service. All the financial system indicators are
deflated by end-of-period prices and their average is divided by GDP that is deflated by annual CPI.
A look at Table 1 shows the variation in banking system measures across the sample. The bank
credit, for example, averages about 66% of GDP (94% in HICs and about 40% in MICs), with the
minimum credit of about 5% issued by deposit banks in Ghana in 1989-1993 and the maximum
amount of about 224% extended by banks in Iceland in 2004-2008. The private credit also averages
about 71% of GDP (101% and 43% in HICS and MICs, respectively). Liquid liabilities ranges from
a minimum of 12% in Peru in 1989-1993 to a maximum of 354% in Luxembourg in 2004-2008, with
the average being 72% (95% in HICs and 50% in MICs).
I.3.1.2 Other variables
As is standard in the literature on finance-growth nexus, we include the following control variables
that have been shown empirically to have robust growth effects: Initial real GDP per capita to
capture the tendency for growth rates to converge across countries and overtime; average years of
schooling in population 25 years of age or older to control for human capital accumulation (both
variables are commonly referred to as Simple Control Set); the ratio of total government final
consumption expenditure (government size) & inflation rate-CPI (both measure macroeconomic
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stability); and sum of imports and exports as a fraction of GDP (trade openness). The last three
variables are policy related and together with the Simple Control set form our Policy Control Set.
The correlations Tables 2 and 3 show that for MICs growth is positively and significantly correlated
with all financial measures except market capitalization. On the other hand, credit measures are
negatively and significantly correlated with growth while traded value and market capitalization
are positively and significantly correlated with growth in case of the HICs.4 Summary statistics for
individual countries is given in Table 4.
4At the same time, the banking system and stock market measures are generally significantly correlated to each
other for both sets of countries (especially in the case of MICs), implying that our model that controls for both bank
and stock markets measures may offer conservative estimates of the role of banks and stock markets in economic
growth than if only one measure is used as a regressor. We use a Wald test to examine if the indicators enter our
regression jointly significantly.
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I.4 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
I.4.1 OLS Regression Results
We start with the King and Levine’s version of the Barro (1991) growth regression model of the
form:
Yi,t = α0 + α
′ Fi,t + β′ Xi,t + i,t (1)
Where,Yi,t is the growth rate of real per capita GDP of country i in period t, Fi,t stands for finan-
cial measures (i.e., banking and stock market measures), Xi,t represents a set of control variables,
including initial /lagged level of real per capita GDP, average years of schooling, government con-
sumption expenditure, inflation rate, and trade openness.
The OLS regressions on the full sample show that (Table 5, Panel A) while there is a strong positive
association between all of the stock market measures and economic growth, none of the banking
system measures enters all of the regressions with significant coefficient. However, when we sort
out the data into the two income groups, the estimates differ. For MICs, all of the banking system
and the stock market measures, except market capitalization, enter each of the regressions with
positive and statistically significant coefficients. In the case of HICs, on the other hand, the bank
measures are either insignificant or negatively significant whereas the stock market traded value
and capitalization are positively and strongly correlated with growth.
These estimates are robust to the inclusion of policy related variables. Table 6, using bank credit
and turnover ratio, demonstrates that the size of the credit issued to the private sector and the
liquidity of the stock market remain strongly positively correlated to economic growth of MICs.
For HICs, while liquidity of stock markets is generally directly associated with growth, the bank
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credits remain negative and even significant as more variables enter our regressions.
The OLS estimates, although do not establish a causal relationship between stock markets, banks,
and growth, give us the first indication that the link between the financial development measures
and economic growth depends, at least partly, on the stages of economic growth of countries.
I.4.2 Dynamic Panel GMM
I.4.2.1 The model
We examine the causal link between economic growth and both the stock market development and
bank development using the dynamic panel generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators5 .
The cross-country growth regression we estimate can be written as follows:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α− 1) yi,t−1 + β′ Xi,t + µi + i,t (2)
where yi,t is the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, Xi,t is a set of explanatory
variables, including measures of stock markets and bank development, µi represents time invariant
country-specific effects, and i,t is the idiosyncratic shocks. We also include time dummies to
account for time-specific effects.
Note that we can rewrite (2) as:
yi,t = α yi,t−1 + β′ Xi,t + µi + i,t (3)
So that the model can equally be thought of as being for the increase or level of y.
Model (3) has a dynamic structure in that the lagged dependent variable enters as an explanatory
variable in the same regression. Applying OLS estimator to this model results in biased and
inconsistent estimates, since the lagged real per capita GDP is correlated with the country fixed
effects in the error term. To remove this dynamic panel bias, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988)
and Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the first-difference transform of (3) as follows:
5For detail description of the various GMM estimators, refer to Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover,
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Hansen, 1982; and Roodman, 2009.
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yi,t − yi,t−1 = α (yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β′ (Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (i,t − i,t−1) (4)
Although the fixed effects are expunged, the lagged per capita GDP is still potentially endogenous,
as the yi,t−1 term in the (yi,t−1−yi,t−2) is correlated with the i,t−1 in the new error term. Moreover,
any of the control variables in X may as well be related to the new error term and becomes poten-
tially endogenous, unless it is strictly exogenous. To overcome this problem, Arellano and Bond
(1991) uses the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments under the assumptions that
the error term,, is not serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous
(i.e., they are uncorrelated with future realizations of error terms). Specifically, this dynamic panel
estimator commonly referred to as Difference GMM, uses the following moment conditions:
E [yi,t−l (i,t − i,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, ..., T (5)
E [Xi,t−l (i,t − i,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, ..., T (6)
However, Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate that when explanatory variables are persistent
over time, the untransformed lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for transformed
variables and this adversely affects the small- sample and asymptotic properties of Difference GMM.
To increase efficiency, Blundell and Bond develop a System GMM, originated in Arellano and Bover
(1995), which augments the difference estimator by estimating simultaneously in differences and
levels, with the two equations being distinctly instrumented. The addition of regression in levels
also allows us to examine the cross-country relationship between our variables of interest. While
the instruments for equation in differences are the same as above, the instruments for equation
in levels are the lagged differences of the explanatory variables.6 These are valid instruments
under the following additional assumption: although there may be correlation between the levels
of the explanatory variables and the country fixed effects in (3), there is no correlation between
the differences of these variables and the country-specific effect.7 This assumption results in the
6The new instruments seem more valid for variables that are very persistent over time, random walk-like variables,
as past changes may be more predictive of contemporaneous levels than past levels are of current changes.
7Remember that we have assumed error term is not serially correlated.
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following stationarity properties:
E[yi,t+p µi] = E[yi,t+q µi] and E[Xi,t+p µi] = E[Xi,t+q µi] for all p and q (7)
The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are:
E[(yi,t−l − yi,t−l−1) (µi + i,t)] = 0 for l = 1, & (8)
E[(Xi,t−l −Xi,t−l−1) (µi + i,t)] = 0 for l = 1, (9)
The dynamic panel GMM-sometimes referred to as System GMM-, thus, uses the moment condi-
tions in Eqs. (5), (6), (8), and (9) to generate consistent and efficient estimates.
The consistency of dynamic panel GMM rests on the validity of the instruments and the assumption
that the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation. In particular, the estimator can suffer from
a potential instrument proliferation; where by the instrument count may become equal to or larger
than the number of cross-sectional units and thereby over -fitting the instrumented variables they
may fail to remove the endogenous components of the variables and result in a biased parameter
estimates towards those from non-instrumenting estimators. We can reduce this instrument count
problem by either restricting the instruments to certain lags instead of all available lags or by
collapsing the instrument matrix. The latter can be formally expressed as:
E [yi,t−l (i,t − i,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2, (10)
E [Xi,t−l (i,t − i,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2. (11)
In dynamic panel GMM, we replace the moment conditions of the standard difference GMM (5
and 6) with (10) and (11). The new moment conditions state the same orthogonality assumption
between the lagged levels and the differenced error term as (5) and (6) but we only want the esti-
mator to minimize the magnitude of the empirical moments
∑
t yi,t−l (ei,t−ei,t−1) for each l, rather
than separate moments
∑
t,l yi,t−l (ei,t − ei,t−1) for each l and t (Roodman, 2009). This method,
known as the Windmeijer correction, significantly minimizes the potential biases that arise due to
over identification problem and boosts the efficiency of our estimates without losing information,
as no lags are actually dropped.
We also use two specification tests. The first relates to instruments and includes Hansen-J test
of the joint validity of the instruments and Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument
subsets (null hypothesis that the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated
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with the residuals). The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term is not second-order
serially correlated (by construction, the differenced error term is likely first-order serially correlated
even if the original is not).
I.4.2.2 Results and discussion
Table 7 Presents summary of the two-step panel GMM regression results for all possible combina-
tions of bank and stock market measures, where coefficients of the simple control set (initial income
and average years of schooling), time dummies, and constants are not reported for brevity.
Panel A shows that for all countries included in the study, none of the different banking system
measures is statistically significant (being negative), whereas the stock market capitalization, in all
cases, and the stock market traded value, in two of the three cases, being positive, are statistically
significant. That is, the size of the stock market and its liquidity with respect to the overall econ-
omy, in general, exert strong positive effect on real per capita GDP growth, but banks do not.
However, separate regressions for the two income groups- MICs and HICs- show quite different out-
comes. While coefficients of bank and private credits are positive and statistically significant in two
of the three cases for MICs (Panel B), all of the coefficient estimates of bank measures are negative
and statistically significant in all cases for HICs (Panel C). For both groups, however, stock market
measures are statistically not significant. These results indicate that after controlling for liquidity
of stock markets, bank and private credits strongly boost economic growth of the MICs but they
(also bank’s liquid liability to GDP ratio) negatively affect economic growth of the HICs. The
regression results also indicate that stock market is not a major determinant of economic growth
of both groups of countries.
Are these results robust to the inclusion of policy related variables to our regression? Table 8
(using Bank credit and turnover ratio) and Table 9 (using private credit and traded value) depict
the findings. As can be seen in Table 8, in the case of MICs bank credit enters all of the regressions
with positive and statistically significant coefficients and the turnover ratio is significant in three
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of the five regressions. The coefficients are also economically significant. For example, if Turkey’s
mean value of bank credit had been at the MICs’ mean value of 40.3% of GDP rather than the
actual 25%, the country’s real GDP per capita would have grown 0.77% points faster per year.8
This is large given that the country’s average growth rate over the study period was about 2.4%
per year. Similarly, if Colombia had moved from its mean value of bank credit of 30% of GDP to
MICs’ mean value of 40.3%, it’s real GDP per capita would have grown almost half a percentage
point faster per year, which is sizable considering the country’s average growth rate of 1.95% per
year over the study period.
In the case of HICs, the bank credit is negatively associated with growth and the coefficients are
statistically significant in three of the five regressions. The same findings hold when different mea-
sures of bank and stock market are used, as illustrated in Table 9. For MICs, private credit is
a major determinant of economic growth as its coefficient is positive and statistically significant
in all of the regressions, whereas for HICs, it can lead to contraction of the economy. The stock
market measures are overall statistically not significant for both country groups. The other control
variables are also generally statistically not significant.
Although only bank measures enter the regressions statistically significantly, the Wald test for joint
significance shows that, in general, both bank and stock market measures enter jointly significantly,
supporting the inclusion of both measures in our regressions to examine if each exerts an indepen-
dent effect on growth. The specification tests also confirm that we cannot reject the null hypotheses
of no second-order serial correlation in the differenced error term and the overall validity of our
instrument sets and subsets. These inference are made based on the two-step panel GMM that
incorporates Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction.
On the other hand, the two-step estimator that does not incorporate the Windmeijer correction
results in unreliable estimates as it suffers from instrumental proliferation. Table 10, columns (2)
and (4) for MICs and (6) and (8) for HICs, for instance, show that when we control for all pol-
icy variables, the number of instruments (45) exceeds the number of cross-sectional observations
8(ln(40.3)- ln(25))* 1.608, the smallest significant coefficient of bank credit, gives us the value.
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(countries) and this over-fitting problem causes the instruments to fail to expunge the endogenous
component of the variables and results in downward biased standard errors and unreliable estimates
(compare column (5) of Table 8 & 9 to columns (2) & (4) of Table 10 for MICs, and column (10) of
Table 8 & 9 to columns (6) & (8) of Table 10 for HICs, respectively).9 The two-step panel GMM
that incorporates the Windmeijer (2005) correction, by reducing the over-fitting problem, results
in consistent estimates and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
In addition to sorting out our sample countries into HICs and MICs and running separate regres-
sions, we also run regressions on the full sample where we interact group dummy variable (MIC
which takes on a value of 1 if the country is middle-income and 0 if the country is high-income)
with bank and stock market measures. Although we implicitly assume coefficients of the control
variables are the same for all countries, the interaction terms between the indicator variable and
bank and stock market measures support our previous findings.
The coefficient of the interaction term between MIC dummy variable and bank measures (Tables 11
and 12) is statistically significant, indicating that the banking sector has a statistically significant
positive effect on economic growth of MICs relative to that of HICs. However, the statistically
insignificant coefficient of the interaction term between MIC dummy variable and stock market
measures imply that stock markets do not boost economic growth of MICs relative to that of HICs.
The model specification tests, again, fail to reject the null hypotheses of overall validity of our
instruments and lack of second-order serial correlation in the differenced error terms.
Does the frequency of data indeed affect our regression results? We apply dynamic panel GMM
method to three-year average data set. Table 13 shows that the results hold in general: While
bank credit enters the MICs regression with positive and statistically significant coefficients, its
coefficient is not significant for HICs. The turnover ratio is not significant for both groups. Re-
gressions involving Private credit and traded value also produce similar results. When we estimate
our model using annual data, the coefficient estimates show that (Table 14) both bank and stock
9Before the Windmeijer (2005) correction was made available, some researchers were relying on one-step estimator
for inferences, but the one-step estimator assumes homoscedastic error terms, which we do not often assume in
empirical studies.
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market measures are insignificant for HICs and only bank measures are significant in some of the
regressions for MICs. That is, the results break-down. Moreover, the specification tests reject the
null hypotheses of no second-order serial correlation between the residuals and/or adequacy of our
instruments. This confirms the importance of using less frequent dataset to assess the long-run
causal relationship between financial development and economic growth, as the financial measures
commonly have inertial from year to year and hence may suffer from serial correlation, and the
frequent business cycle fluctuations can also mask the true relationship between variables of interest.
I.4.3 Traditional GMM
I.4.3.1 The model
We also apply iterative traditional GMM to the three-year average data set10 , where we estimate
the growth model given below, as a system of equations- one per each country- with cross-equation
restrictions imposed on coefficients of financial measures and other controls.
y1t = X1tβ + 1t,
y2t = X2tβ + 2t,
(. . .),
yNt = XNtβ + Nt

(12)
Where yit is the growth rate of real per capita GDP for country i at time t; Xit is a 1 x k vector of
explanatory variables including stock market and banking sector measures, initial/lagged values of
real per capita GDP, average years of schooling, government final consumption expenditure, infla-
tion rate, trade openness, and constant; β is a k x 1 vector of unknown parameters; it is a random
error term; i= 1,2,...,N represents each equation (country in the sample); and t= 1989,...,2012-the
time period the data covers.
GMM is based on moment conditions that have zero expectation in the population when evaluated
at the true parameters:
10We use the three-year average data with traditional GMM as it allows us to use more observations and information
to estimate our parameters in a system of equations.
27
E [g(Zi;β)] = E
[
Z′ii
]
= E
[
Z′i (yi −Xiβ)
]
= 0 (13),
Where, g(Zi;β) = Z
′
ii = Z
′
i (yi − Xiβ) denotes the moment conditions and Z′i a vector of
instruments.
Hansen (1982) proposes minimizing the following quadratic form with respect to β, which brings the
sample moments as close to zero as possible, to obtain the GMM estimator of the true parameter
values11 :
min
β
[
N∑
i=1
g(Zi;β)
]′
.W.
[
N∑
i=1
g(Zi;β)
]
(14),
(1 x L) (LxL) (Lx1)
Where W is a positive definite LxL weighting matrix (L= number of instruments).
That is, as Hansen (1982) describes it, ”A GMM estimator of the true parameter vector is obtained
by finding the element of the parameter space that sets linear combinations of the sample cross
products as close to zero as possible”. For a positive definite weighting matrix (W), the value of the
parameter that minimizes the above quadratic form is thus known as a minimum distance estimator.
Assuming that the moment conditions are continuously differentiable, the GMM estimator satisfies
the first-order condition:
[
N∑
i=1
∇β g
(
Zi; βˆ
)]′
.W.
[
N∑
i=1
g
(
Zi; βˆ
)]
= 0 (15),
(kxL) (LxL) (Lx1) (kx1)
Where,
11This is particularly true if the model is overidentified. Hansen (1982) and Hayashi (2000) provide detail analysis
of GMM.
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∇β g
(
Zi; βˆ
)
=

∂
∂β1
g
(
Zi; βˆ1, βˆ2, . . . , βˆk
)′
∂
∂β2
g
(
Zi; βˆ1, βˆ2, . . . , βˆk
)′
(. . .)
∂
∂βk
g
(
Zi; βˆ1, βˆ2, . . . , βˆk
)′

=
[
−Z′i x1i −Z
′
i x2i (. . .) −Z
′
i xki
]
= −Z′iXi (16)
The first-order condition becomes
[
N∑
i=1
Z
′
iXi
]′
.W .
[
N∑
i=1
Z
′
i(yi −Xiβˆ)
]
= 0 (17)
It follows that
[
N∑
i=1
Z
′
iXi
]′
.W .
[
N∑
i=1
Z
′
iyi
]
=
[
N∑
i=1
Z
′
iXi
]′
.W .
[
N∑
i=1
Z
′
iXiβˆ
]
(18)
Hence the solution for βˆ is:
βˆ =
[ N∑
i=1
Z
′
iXi
]′
.W .
N∑
i=1
Z
′
iXi
−1 [ N∑
i=1
Z
′
iXi
]′
.W .
[
N∑
i=1
Z
′
iyi
]
(19),
Which can be written in data matrices as:
βˆGMM =
((
Z
′
X
)′
.W.Z
′
X
)−1 (
Z
′
X
)′
.W.Z
′
y (20)
βˆGMM =
((
X
′
Z
)
.W.
(
Z
′
X
))−1 (
X
′
Z
)
.W.Z
′
y (21)
In finite samples, the choice of the weighting matrix (W) is important, as different W-matrices will
lead to different point estimates. This is particularly true with one-step and two-step estimators.
The iterative GMM, on the other hand, can remedy this drawback as it continually updates the
weight matrix until some sort of convergence has been achieved.
Among all possible candidates, the best choice for the weighting matrix is the inverse of the covari-
ance of the moments:
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W =
[
V ar
(
Z
′
ii
)]−1
(22)
That is, high-variance moments will be assigned lower weight in the criterion function-since they
contain less information about the population parameter- than low-variance moments. This choice
of the weight matrix produces efficient (or optimal) GMM estimators; that is, GMM estimators
with the smallest variances, asymptotically, as shown by Hansen (1982) and Hayashi (2000).
Both the financial measures and other controls are likely to be correlated with the error term (that
they are endogenous) and hence we use valid instruments in our regression. Specifically, we have
instrumented bank credit (and private credit) by lags of liquid liability of the banking system,
turnover ratio (and traded value) by lags of stock market capitalization, and the other controls
by their respective lagged values, under the assumption that our instruments are exogenous and
relevant. The motivation for the choice of instruments for our financial measures is as follows: both
liquid liability of the banking system and the stock market capitalization measure the overall sizes
of the banking sector and stock market, respectively, and we assume the larger the banking sector/
stock market, the better financial services- including credit service- it can render/ the more active
and liquid the market becomes12. We then have tested both instrument exogeneity (cov(Zi, i) = 0)
and relevance (cov(Zi, Xi) 6= 0) using both Hansen’s J test and Stock and Yogo’s weak instrument
test, respectively.
Theoretically, when dealing with small sample data the iterative system GMM method applied to
homogeneous countries produces more efficient estimates than panel GMM as it utilizes more infor-
mation in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals; it also continuously updates the estimation
procedure until our statistical estimates from successive steps converge and this can help remedy
the drawback of one-step and two-step estimators, where different weighting matrices will lead to
different point estimates. The traditional GMM is also more flexible than the panel GMM which
is better suited to short but wide panels (panels with small T and large N).
12We also instrument the bank and stock market measures by their own respective lagged values and compare
results.
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I.4.3.2 Results and discussion
Tables 15 shows that financial measures, particularly bank credit, exert robust and positive effect
on economic growth of MICs, as bank credit is positive and statistically significant in three of the
four regressions and turnover ratio in two of the four regressions. In case of the HICs, on the
other hand, these measures are overall not statistically significant. Both the dynamic panel GMM
and iterative traditional GMM regression results imply that while bank credits and stock market
liquidity (marginally) have a robust growth impact in the case of MICs, the same cannot be said
of their effect on economic growth of the HICs.
A panel regression that does not address the heterogeneity in the cross-country units may conceal
the likely differential effects of financial development that arise from differences in the stages of
economic development of countries, among other factors. In order to attenuate this problem and ob-
tain a more policy relevant outcome, we further sort out the countries into four more homogeneous
income groups: Upper-and Lower-MICs and European- and Non-European-HICs and run separate
regressions for these relatively more homogeneous sub-groups. We expect the more homogeneous
the countries, the more representative the coefficient estimates are of each country in the group.
The traditional system GMM regression results (Table 16) depict that while coefficient estimates of
both bank credit and turnover ratio are statistically significant for Upper-MICs, only bank credit
enters the Lower-MICs growth regression with significant coefficients. This implies that bank cred-
its are strong determinants of economic growth of both Upper- and Lower-MICs. The stock market
liquidity, however, exerts a robust influence on economic growth of only Upper-MICs.
For HICs, the coefficient estimates of both bank credit and turnover ratio are found to be generally
not significant (Table 15). Regressions involving the two sub-groups indicate that (Table 17) stock
market liquidity is not statistically significant for European HICs and only statistically significant
in two of the four regressions for the Non-European HICs. The bank credit is also found to be not
robust in the case of Non-Europeans, although it enters the European HICs regressions with sig-
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nificant coefficients.13 The fact that stock market measures are overall statistically not significant
for HICs, except that they are marginally significant for Non-European HICs (includes countries
such as the U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and others with most developed stock markets), is
somewhat surprising as stock markets are regarded as having comparative advantage over banks in
raising funds for innovative and high-tech investments that characterize these countries. The fact
that the banking system explains economic growth better than the stock market does in European-
HICs may be due to the strong common monetary policy adopted in the region. As some studies,
including Rose (2014), indicate banks and bond markets, particularly those with long-term matu-
rity, are more effective at influencing economic growth under inflation-targeting regimes.
For MICs, the lower-MICs in particular, the insignificant coefficient estimates of stock market mea-
sures perhaps imply that the already established stock markets may have not yet reached some
minimum size and activity level beyond which they robustly influence economic growth, or that the
stock markets may suffer from lack of transparency- limited firm-specific information in particular-
which by hindering effective exercise of property rights and corporate governance by investors
(shareholders) leads to poor performance of stock markets (Jin and Meyers, 2006), or that the
banking system, by establishing and nurturing a long-run personal relationship with investors may
have continued to be the major source of financial services in these countries.
The findings that for lower-MICs the banking system measures are statistically significant but the
stock markets are generally not lends credence to the argument put forward by Singh & Weisse
(1998) and Lin (2009) that developing countries should focus on making the banking sector the
primary source of their financial services rather than diverting scarce resources to the promotion of
sophisticated financial institutions, like stock markets, which not only rely on more sophisticated
monitoring and infrastructure but also encourage short-term profits.
Our finding of lack of robust growth effect of financial sector, especially for HICs, is in line with the
findings of some recent cross-country and panel studies: although financial deepening had a positive
13We have also used own lagged values to instrument for banking and stock markets and results are generally not
statistically different from the major findings.
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and significant effect on growth between 1960-1989 (a period covered by most of the early studies
that established a positive relationship between financial development and economic growth), its
effect vanishes during the later period, 1990-2004, a period characterized by recurrent financial
crises (Rousseau & Wachtel, 2011); the prevalence of excess bank credit -credit boom-in many
developed countries is dampening economic growth (Arcand et al., 2012); and there is no clear
evidence that finance spurs growth, although the correlation between the two is well-established
(Favara, 2003).
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I.5 CONCLUSION
This paper examined the growth effects of stock market and banking sector development for 64
HICs and MICs. Dynamic panel GMM estimation results show that while bank credit and stock
market liquidity-to a limited extent- exert strong positive impacts on economic growth of middle-
income countries, their effect on growth of high-income countries is at best tenuous. The iterative
traditional GMM applied to both high- and middle-income countries, where we run a system of
growth equations, one for each country, also produces similar results. A closer look at smaller but
relatively more homogeneous sub-groups indicate that bank credit spurs growth of both Upper-and
Lower- MICs but stock market liquidity has a robust impact on growth of only the Upper-MICs.
For HICs, the bank credit is found to be not robust and the stock market liquidity is only marginally
significant in the case of Non-Europeans. In the case of European HICs, the stock market liquidity
is found to be not a strong determinant of growth, although bank credit is.
The results imply that the effects of financial development on economic growth depend, at least
partly, on the stages of economic development of countries. Hence, any study that aims at providing
an empirical support to the competing theories and furthering our understanding of the finance-
growth nexus is best served if focused on a more thorough examination of either homogeneous
countries or individual country cases.
34
REFERENCES
Aghion, P., Bacchetta, P., Ranciere, R., & Rogoff, K. (2009). Exchange rate volatility and
productivity growth: The role of financial development. Journal of Monetary Economics,
56, 494-513.
Aghion, P., Howitt, P., & Mayer-Foulkes, D. (2005). The effect of financial development on
convergence: Theory and evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 173-222.
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1997). Financial markets, intermediaries, and intertemporal smooth-
ing.Journal of Political Economy, 105(3), 523-546.
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1999). Diversity of opinion and financing of new technologies.Journal
of Financial Intermediation, 8, 68-89.
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000). Comparing financial systems. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.
Ang, J.B., & McKibbin, W.J. (2007). Financial liberalization, financial sector development
and growth: Evidence from Taiwan.Journal of Development Economics, 84, 215-233.
Arcand, J.L., Berkes, E., & Panizza, U. (2012). Too much finance? IMF Working Paper,
12/161.
Arestis, P., Demetriades, P.O., & Luintel, K.B. (2001). Financial development and economic
growth: the role of stock markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33(1), 16-41.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58,
277-297.
35
Arellano, M., Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental-variable estimation of
error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29-52.
Bagehot, W. (1873). Lombard Street: A description of the money market. New York, NY:
Scribner, Armstrong & Co.
Barro, R. (1991). Economic growth in a cross section of countries. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 407-443.
Barro, R., & Lee, J.W. (2010). A New data set of educational attainment in the world,
1950-2010.Journal of Development Economics, 104, 184-198.
Beck, T. (2011). The role of finance in economic development: Benefits, risks, and politics.
European Banking Center Discussion Paper, 2011-038.
Beck, T. (2013). Finance, growth and fragility: The role of government.International Journal
of Banking, Accounting and Finance, 5 (1/2), 49-77.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Peria, M.S.M. (2007). Reaching out: Access to and use of
banking services across countries. Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 234-266.
Beck, T., & Levine, R. (2004). Stock markets, banks, and growth: Panel evidence. Journal
of Banking and Finance, 28, 423-442.
Beck, T., Levine, R., & Loayza, N. (2000). Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of
Financial Economics, 58, 261-300.
Beck, T., Levine, R., & Levkov, A. (2010). Big bad banks? The winners and losers from
bank deregulation in the United States. Journal of Finance, 65, 1637-1667.
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C.R., & Lundblad, C. (2005). Does financial liberalization spur growth?
Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 3-55.
Bencivenga, V.R., & Smith, B.D. (1991). Financial intermediation and endogenous growth.
Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 195-209.
Bencivenga, V.R., Smith, B.D., & Starr, R.M. (1995). Transactions costs, technological
choice, and endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Theory, 67, 153-177.
36
Benhabib, J., & Spiegel, M.M. (2000). The role of financial development in growth and
investment. Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 341-360.
Bertocco, G. (2008). Finance and development: Is Schumpeteraˆs analysis still relevant?
Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(6), 1161-1175.
Bhattacharya, P.C., & Sivasubramanian, M.N. (2003). Financial development and economic
growth in India: 1970-1971 to 1998-1999. Applied Financial Economics, 13, 925-929.
Bhide, A. (1993). The hidden costs of stock market liquidity. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 34, 31-51.
Boot, A.W.A., & Thakor, A. (1997). Financial system architecture.Review of Financial
Studies, 10(3), 693-733.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel
data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143.
Bordo, M.D., & Rousseau, P.L. (2012). Historical evidence on the finance-trade-growth
nexus. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 1236-1243.
Boyd, J.H., & Smith, B.D (1998). The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic
development. Economic Theory, 12, 519-560.
Calderon, C., & Liu, L. (2003). The direction of causality between financial development
and economic growth. Journal of Development Economics, 72, 321-334.
Chakraborty, S., & Ray, T. (2006). Bank-based versus market-based financial systems: A
growth-theoretic analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, 329-350.
Chang, T.Y., & Caudill, S.B. (2005). Financial development and economic growth: The case
of Taiwan. Applied Economics, 37, 1329-1335.
Christopoulos, D.K., & Tsionas, E.G. (2004). Financial development and economic growth:
Evidence from panel unit root and cointegration tests. Journal of Development Economics,
73, 55-74.
37
Coval, J.D., & Thakor, A.V. (2005). Financial intermediation as a beliefs-bridge between
optimists and pessimists. Journal of Financial Economics, 75, 535-569.
Dawson, P.J. (2010). Financial development and economic growth: A panel approach. Ap-
plied Economics Letters, 17(8), 741-745.
De Gregorio, J., & Guidotti, P. (1995). Financial development and economic growth. World
Development, 23, 434-448.
Deidda, L., & Fattouh, B. (2002). Non-linearity between finance and growth.Economics
Letters, 74, 339-345.
Deidda, L., & Fattouh, B. (2008). Banks, financial markets and growth. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 17, 6-36.
Demetriades, P.O., & Hussein, A.K. (1996). Does financial development cause economic
growth? Time-series evidence from 16 countries. Journal of Development Economics, 51,
387-411.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Feyen, E., & Levine, R. (2013). The evolving importance of banks and
securities markets. World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (1998). Law, finance, and firm growth. Journal of
Finance, 53(6), 2107-2137.
Diamond, D.W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 51(3), 393-414.
Favara, G. (2003). An empirical reassessment of the relationship between finance and growth.
IMF Working Paper, 03/123, European I Department.
Goldsmith, R.W., (1969). Financial structure and development. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity press.
Greenwood, J., & Jovanovic, B. (1990). Financial development, growth and the distribution
of income.Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), 1076-1107.
38
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2004). Does local financial development matter?
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 929-969.
Hansen, L.P., (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators.
Econometrica, 50(4), 1029-1054.
Hassan, M.K., Sanchez, B., & Yu, J.S. (2011). Financial development and economic growth:
New evidence from panel data. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 51,
88-104.
Hayashi, F., (2000). Econometrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1993). Market liquidity and performance monitoring. Journal
of Political Economy, 101(4), 678-709.
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1997). Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real
sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 663-691.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., Rosen, H. (1988). Estimating vector autoregressions with
panel data. Econometrica, 56 (6), 1371-1395.
Ilyina, A., & Samaniego, R. (2012). Structural change and financing constraints. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 59, 166-179.
International Monetary Fund Statistics Department (2000). INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2000. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Vol. LIII.
International Monetary Fund Statistics Department (2005). INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2005. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Vol. LVIII.
Jin, L., Myers, S.C. (2006). R2 around the world: New theory and new tests. Journal of
Financial economics, 79, 257-292.
39
Kar, M., Nazlioglu, S., & Agir, H. (2011). Financial development and economic growth nexus
in the MENA countries: Bootstrap panel granger causality analysis. Economic Modelling,
28, 685-693.
Khan, A. (2001). Financial development and economic growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics,
5(3), 413-433.
King, R.G., & Levine, R. (1993a). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 717-738.
King, R.G., & Levine, R. (1993b). Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth: Theory and
evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 513-542.
Levine, R. (1991). Stock markets, growth, and tax policy. Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1445-
1465.
Levine, R. (1997). Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda. Journal
of Economic Literature, 35(2), 688-726.
Levine, R. (2005). Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. In Aghion, P., & Durlauf,
S.N. (Eds.), Handbook of economic growth (865-934). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Levine, R., Loayza, N., & Beck, T. (2000). Financial intermediation and growth: Causality
and causes. Journal of Monetary Economics, 46, 31-77.
Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American
Economic Review. 88(3), 537-558.
Lin, J. (2009, July 11). Walk, don’t run. The Economist.
Loayza, N. V. & Ranciere, R. (2006). Financial development, financial fragility, and growth.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(4), 1051-1076.
Lucas, R.E. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 22, 3-42.
Luintel, K.B., & Khan, M. (1999). A quantitative reassessment of the finance-growth nexus:
Evidence from a multivariate VAR. Journal of Development Economics, 60, 381-405.
40
Luintel, K.B., Khan, M., Arestis, P., & Theodoridis, K. (2008). Financial structure and
economic growth. Journal of Development Economics, 86, 181-200.
McCaig, B., & Stengos, T. (2005). Financial intermediation and growth: Some robustness
results. Economics Letters, 88, 306-312.
McKinnon, R. (1973). Money & capital in economic development. Washington, D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution.
Merton, R.C., & Bodie, Z. (1995). A conceptual framework for analyzing the financial en-
vironment. In Crane, D., Froot, K.A., Mason, S.P., Perold, A.F., Merton, R.C., Bodie,
Z.,... & Tuffano, P., The global financial system: A functional perspective (3-31). Boston,
MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Morales, M.F. (2003). Financial intermediation in a model of growth through creative de-
struction. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 7(3), 363-393.
Rajan, R.G., & Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Economic
Review, 88(3), 559-586.
Rioja, F., & Valev, N. (2004). Does one size fit all? A reexamination of the finance and
growth relationship. Journal of Development Economics, 74, 429-447.
Robinson, J. (1952). The generalization of the general theory. In The rate of interest and
other essays (67-142). London: Macmillan.
Roodman, D. (2009). A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 71(1), 135-158.
Rose, A.K. (2014). The bond market: An inflation-targeter’s best friend. NBER Working
Paper 20494.
Rousseau, P.L., & Sylla, R. (2005). Emerging financial markets and early US growth. Ex-
plorations in Economic History, 42, 1-26.
Rousseau, P.L., & Wachtel, P. (2000). Equity markets and growth: Cross-country evidence
on timing and outcomes, 1980-1995.Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, 1933-1957.
41
Rousseau, P.L., & Wachtel, P. (2002). Inflation thresholds and the finance-growth nexus.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 21(6), 777-793.
Rousseau, P.L., & Wachtel, P. (2011). What is happening to the impact of financial deep-
ening on economic growth? Economic Inquiry, 49(1), 276-288.
Saci, K., Giorgioni, G., & Holden, K. (2009). Does financial development affect growth?
Applied Economics, 41, 1701-1707.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934). The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits,
capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shan, J. (2005). Does financial development ’lead’ economic growth? A vector auto-
regression appraisal. Applied Economics, 37, 1353-1367.
Shaw, E.S. (1973). Financial deepening in economic development. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Singh, A., & Weisse, B.A. (1998). Emerging stock markets, portfolio capital flows and
long-term economic growth: Micro and macroeconomic perspectives. World Development,
26(4), 607-622.
Song, F., & Thakor, A.V. (2012). Financial system architecture and the co-evolution of
banks and capital markets. Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Standard & Poor’s (2000). EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 2000. New York,
NY: A McGraw-Hill Company.
Standard & Poor’s (2001). EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 2001. New York,
NY: A McGraw-Hill Company.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1985). Credit markets and the control of capital. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 17(2), 133-152.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1994). The role of the state in financial markets. In Bruno, M., & Pleskovic,
B. (Eds.), Proceedings of the World Bank annual conference on development economics.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
42
Stock, J.H., Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In An-
drews, D.W.K., Identification and inference for econometric models (80-108). New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Stulz, R.M. (2000). Financial structure, corporate finance and economic growth. Interna-
tional Review of Finance, 1(1), 11-38.
Windmeijer, F. (2005). A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step
GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126, 25-51.
Wu, J.L., Hou, H., & Cheng, S.Y. (2010). The dynamic impacts of financial institutions on
economic growth: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of Macroeconomics, 32,
879-891.
Xu, Z. (2000). Financial development, investment and economic growth. Economic Inquiry,
38(2), 331-344.
Zhang, J., Wang, L., & Wang, S. (2012). Financial development and economic growth:
Recent evidence from China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 40, 393-412.
43
APPENDIX I: Tables for Chapter I
44
Table I.1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
All Countries (64)
Economic growth 2.04 2.40 -8.38 10.39
Bank credit 66.02 47.33 4.84 224.01
Private credit 71.1 51.15 4.84 224.01
Liquid liabilities 71.62 53.26 11.94 353.89
Turnover ratio 52.62 55.43 0.02 376.85
Traded value 37.8 62.65 0.002 621.33
Mkt. Capitalization 58.22 60.76 0.033 478.67
Initial Income 15228.91 16424.59 366.23 85529.8
Schooling 7.94 2.52 1.97 13.25
Govt. size 16.37 5.18 5.49 30.72
Inflation 27.88 173.82 -2.97 2282.4
Openness 84.33 64.9 15.87 425.63
Middle-income countries(33)
Economic growth 2.47 2.68 -8.38 10.39
Bank credit 40.3 29.67 4.84 147.28
Private credit 43.38 33.91 4.84 150.97
Liquid liabilities 50.02 30.31 11.94 169.08
Turnover ratio 34.26 51.68 0.021 376.85
Traded value 15.04 25.68 0.002 124.56
Mkt. Capitalization 38.17 42.69 0.033 236.37
Initial Income 2715.31 1916.14 366.23 8312.76
Schooling 6.31 2.02 1.97 11.69
Govt. size 13.84 4.03 5.49 28.62
Inflation 49.58 239.92 -0.01 2282.4
Openness 72.38 40.53 15.87 206.98
High-income countries(31)
Economic growth 1.59 1.98 -5.65 6.76
Bank credit 93.75 47.23 18.48 224.01
Private credit 101 49.82 17.58 224.01
Liquid liabilities 94.77 62.21 30 353.89
Turnover ratio 71.82 52.8 0.20 325.73
Traded value 61.59 79.07 0.23 621.33
Mkt. Capitalization 79.44 69.39 1.10 478.67
Initial Income 28469.12 14490.2 4631.5 85529.8
Schooling 9.67 1.69 5.37 13.25
Govt. size 19.05 4.92 7.08 30.72
Inflation 4.78 15.57 -2.99 191.77
Openness 97.05 81.61 18.03 425.63
Note: Except Initial Income and Schooling, all variables are expressed as percentage values.
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Table I.4. Bank & Stock market measures and economic growth, country average, 1989-2012
Country Econ. Bank Private Liquid Turnover Traded Market
Growth Credit Credit Liab. ratio value cap.
Argentina* 2.611 17.456 17.852 25.684 20.433 3.067 25.173
Australia 1.639 92.322 92.322 70.411 65.333 61.647 90.705
Austria 1.417 104.647 105.06 91.575 50.872 12.158 20.725
Belgium 1.012 75.885 75.913 88.437 31.524 18.724 56.51
Bolivia* 1.901 42.746 44.166 45.075 0.917 0.102 13.95
Brazil* 1.314 51.232 52.167 42.952 54.065 20.527 39.066
Barbados 0.563 57.376 57.57 78.712 3.688 3.316 72.795
Botswana* 2.91 18.043 18.084 29.85 5.286 0.806 21.79
Canada 1.132 96.867 122.867 93.622 62.036 59.658 93.559
China* 8.434 106.948 107.549 123.573 147.283 56.287 40.942
Cote d’Ivoire* -0.646 19.515 19.754 27.952 2.201 0.355 15.832
Colombia* 1.95 29.988 33.852 22.923 9.946 2.91 27.571
Denmark 0.987 119.556 119.675 61.49 65.374 35.57 52.703
Ecuador* 1.282 20.227 20.564 23.882 5.41 0.347 6.402
Egypt* 2.608 39.034 39.034 79.317 27.322 11.748 33.033
Finland 1.377 74.367 75.262 57.183 78.518 72.556 82.297
France 1.044 95.299 95.354 68.533 75.447 72.556 63.258
Germany 1.508 105.988 105.988 92.169 120.738 45.744 39.104
Ghana* 2.967 10.586 10.759 22.21 3.468 0.372 12.605
Greece 0.63 63.137 63.242 77.145 47.891 22.746 39.827
Hong Kong 2.752 155.777 154.424 230.957 73.508 263.571 324.407
Hungary 0.966 43.633 43.682 48.777 60.776 13.477 17.793
Indonesia* 3.616 34.38 35.525 40.683 46.723 11.421 27.109
India* 4.545 33.556 33.556 54.45 98.709 42.471 48.051
Iran* 3.302 22.977 22.977 40.097 17.463 2.838 16.172
Iceland 1.015 105.62 105.664 56.778 41.876 44.072 61.937
Israel 1.866 77.558 77.558 83.846 59.655 31.162 58.783
Italy 0.561 80.77 81.028 65.166 101.33 33.214 30.684
Jamaica* 0.576 24.453 24.454 45.072 5.55 2.541 54.159
Jordan* 1.107 72.107 72.263 113.823 28.1 37.066 105.946
Japan 1.078 139.94 193.085 202.194 78.175 61.35 76.841
Kenya* 0.411 26.014 30.02 41.51 5.877 1.601 23.832
Korea 4.226 98.446 99.88 71.066 190.457 109.291 60.317
Luxembourg 2.124 127.235 127.296 320.509 1.328 1.886 149.121
Malaysia* 3.63 114.035 115.394 114.087 38.053 64.32 159.589
Mauritius* 3.546 62.329 62.357 80.689 5.606 2.249 39.291
Mexico* 1.287 18.418 20.558 25.235 32.451 8.396 27.899
Morocco* 2.334 44.514 45.67 79.584 16.616 7.718 38.452
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Table I.4.... Continued
Country Econ. Bank Private Liquid Turnover Traded Market
Growth Credit Credit Liab. ratio value cap.
Netherlands 1.548 138.39 138.465 98.412 99.811 93.674 90.278
New Zealand 1.117 110.945 110.945 79.8 35.964 14.061 41.386
Nigeria* 2.98 16.31 16.406 22.272 8.286 1.667 14.487
Norway 1.604 67.945 67.997 53.574 85.595 41.295 42.162
Pakistan* 1.718 23.879 23.913 41.27 150.753 28.264 18.839
Panama* 3.998 74.939 81.001 68.75 2.352 0.455 22.286
Peru* 2.294 19.321 20.133 25.451 15.224 3.368 32.081
Philippines* 1.89 32.007 32.028 51.701 23.391 12.09 53.739
Poland 2.864 31.293 31.302 39.718 60.726 7.724 18.195
Portugal 1.422 118.112 118.271 98.945 52.968 18.68 31.55
Russia* 0.291 23.369 23.758 27.962 65.855 24.897 34.395
Saudi Arabia 1.656 28.707 28.526 48.534 77.813 64.67 58.066
Singapore 3.59 96.022 96.027 115.187 60.303 92.112 161.407
South Africa* 0.786 66.141 128.12 47.798 33.56 60.43 169.98
Spain 1.406 125.778 125.903 100.353 125.281 89.271 63.534
Sri Lanka* 4.391 25.619 25.645 38.246 15.32 2.785 18.37
Swaziland* 1.504 18.201 18.34 22.729 0.814 0.074 10.416
Sweden 1.545 82.326 110.367 54.778 85.378 83.245 90.961
Switzerland 0.763 159.845 159.852 152.614 84.26 159.645 183.563
Thailand* 3.904 109.459 116.638 95.203 84.012 44.557 59.547
Trinidad & Tobago 2.992 33.586 40.21 51.554 5.155 1.73 52.687
Tunisia* 2.804 56.139 62.698 54.272 12.106 1.663 13.116
Turkey* 2.428 24.999 24.999 32.64 131.858 32.005 24.33
UK 1.551 143.504 143.856 112.228 89.503 110.808 125.916
United States 1.422 50.694 161.113 65.014 149.065 166.063 108.146
Uruguay* 2.753 31.096 31.271 39.238 1.821 0.031 0.843
Note: * represents MIC, and the rest HIC. The values are based on 5-year average data.
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Table I.5. Banks, stock markets, and economic growth: OLS regression
Dependent Variable: Per capita real GDP growth rate
Banking System measures
Bank credit Private credit Liquid liabilities
Panel A. All Countries(64)
Turnover ratio Bank measure
0.478** 0.330 0.650***
(0.219) (0.218) (0.235)
Stock mkt measure
0.268*** 0.282*** 0.291***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.085)
Traded value Bank measure
0.254 0.070 0.395
(0.231) (0.232) (0.247)
Stock mkt measure
0.285*** 0.309*** 0.282***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.067)
Capitalization Bank measure
0.335 0.154 0.354
(0.235) (0.236) (0.268)
Stock mkt measure
0.427*** 0.471*** 0.423***
(0.140) (0.143) (0.144)
Panel B. Middle-Income Countries (33)
Turnover ratio Bank measure
0.900*** 0.711** 1.033***
(0.289) (0.281) (0.346)
Stock mkt measure
0.356*** 0.379*** 0.366***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.122)
Traded value Bank measure
0.856*** 0.639** 0.957**
(0.311) (0.303) (0.375)
Stock mkt measure
0.202** 0.226** 0.209**
(0.093) (0.094) (0.093)
Capitalization Bank measure
1.168*** 0.954*** 1.344***
(0.319) (0.316) (0.390)
Stock mkt measure
-0.047 -0.013 -0.050
(0.193) (0.199) (0.197)
Panel C. High-Income Countries(31)
Turnover ratio Bank measure
-0.288 -0.370 0.152
(0.370) (0.400) (0.362)
Stock mkt measure
0.204 0.215 0.191
(0.132) (0.134) (0.131)
Traded value Bank measure
-0.792** -1.069*** -0.071
(0.361) (0.395) (0.339)
Stock mkt measure
0.521*** 0.565*** 0.440***
(0.106) (0.109) (0.101)
Capitalization Bank measure
-0.913*** -1.196*** -1.000***
(0.333) (0.361) (0.344)
Stock mkt measure
1.259*** 1.331*** 1.338***
(0.181) (0.183) (0.189)
Notes: All the regressions are based on the 5 year average panel data and include Simple Control Set and
constant, which are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *,**,& *** represent
significance levels at 10%,5%,& 1% respectively.
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Table I.7. Banks, stock markets, and economic growth: Panel GMM regression
Dependent Variable: Per capita real GDP growth rate
Banking System measures
Bank credit Private credit Liquid liabilities
Panel A. All Countries(64)
Turnover ratio Bank measure
-0.235 -0.223 -0.233
(1.260) (1.524) (3.097)
Stock mkt measure
-0.513 -0.666 -0.680
(1.980) (1.744) (1.602)
Traded value Bank measure
-1.169 -1.451 -1.155
(1.066) (1.239) (3.075)
Stock mkt measure
1.068* 1.134* 1.004
(0.629) (0.666) (0.692)
Capitalization Bank measure
-1.649 -2.015 -0.085
(1.578) (1.662) (2.018)
Stock mkt measure
7.242*** 7.016*** 7.248***
(2.701) (2.567) (1.912)
Panel B. Middle-Income Countries (33)
Turnover ratio Bank measure
2.602** 2.818** 3.310
(1.181) (1.253) (3.731)
Stock mkt measure
0.723 0.789* 0.321
(0.439) (0.447) (1.330)
Traded value Bank measure
2.715** 2.974** 7.619
(1.251) (1.248) (4.829)
Stock mkt measure
0.260 0.298 -1.760
(0.573) (0.574) (1.785)
Capitalization Bank measure
1.477 1.621 0.872
(2.701) (3.302) (3.987)
Stock mkt measure
5.709* 6.033 5.405
(3.224) (3.662) (5.338)
Panel C. High-Income Countries(31)
Turnover ratio Bank measure
-3.481** -4.137** -4.009***
(1.538) (1.618) (1.359)
Stock mkt measure
0.027 0.061 -0.191
(0.348) (0.334) (0.689)
Traded value Bank measure
-3.410* -4.009** -3.774**
(1.769) (1.568) (1.467)
Stock mkt measure
-0.184 0.015 -0.559
(0.477) (0.428) (1.028)
Capitalization Bank measure
-2.057* -2.833** -2.980*
(1.174) (1.144) (1.545)
Stock mkt measure
0.910 1.042 0.790
(0.804) (0.686) (0.816)
Notes: All regressions are two-step panel GMM, incorporating Windmeijer (2005) correction, with robust
standard errors in parentheses. They include simple control set, time dummies, and constant, which are
not reported. *,**, & *** indicate significance level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% , respectively.
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Table I.10. Stock markets, banks, and growth: Panel GMM regression, robustness
Dependent Variable: Per capita real GDP growth rate
Variable
Middle-income countries(33) High-income countries (31)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bank credit
0.860 0.467 -1.771 -1.368*
(1.586) (0.745) (1.164) (0.753)
Private credit
1.089 0.503 -2.251* -0.859
(1.440) (1.033) (1.174) (0.897)
Turnover ratio
0.368*** 0.485** 0.267 0.620
(0.112) (0.237) (0.674) (0.385)
Traded Value
0.084 0.055 0.396 0.502
(0.257) (0.245) (0.690) (0.552)
Initial income
-1.21 -1.262 -1.433 -1.106 -2.43 -0.497 -1.092 -1.226
(1.514) (1.198) (1.556) (0.945) (2.671) (1.119) (1.989) (1.371)
Schooling
3.586 2.621 3.269 2.122 2.468 4.880* 3.681 4.279
(2.901) (2.314) (3.075) (2.715) (8.472) (2.598) (5.804) (3.648)
Govt. cons.
1.62 1.504 -1.361 -2.646
(2.401) (2.177) (1.361) (2.050)
Inflation
0.366 0.667 5.195 8.377
(1.070) (1.033) (6.589) (5.469)
Trade openness
0.044 0.081 2.171 0.567
(1.053) (0.886) (1.604) (1.475)
Constant
0.205 -0.93 2.719 0.16 27.848 -5.975 13.37 12.208
(12.068) (11.600) (11.325) (9.705) (22.989) (14.404) (13.042) (19.067)
Observations 98 98 98 98 91 91 91 91
No. of countries 33 33 33 33 31 31 31 31
Instruments 27 45 27 45 27 45 27 45
AR(2) testa 0.179 0.168 0.193 0.176 0.170 0.127 0.153 0.150
Hansen J testb 0.269 0.900 0.092 0.868 0.339 0.948 0.208 0.943
Diff-in-Han. testb 0.319 0.802 0.116 0.888 0.351 1.000 0.193 1.000
Wald test of 0.005 0.136 0.734 0.862 0.281 0.005 0.167 0.465
joint sig.
Notes: All regressions are two-step panel GMM, without incorporating Windmeijer (2005) correction, with
robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respec-
tively. All regressions include time dummies which are not reported. All variables are in log form.P-values
of the post-estimation tests are reported;(a)The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference re-
gression exhibit no second-order serial correlation;(b)The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are
not correlated with the residuals.
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Table I.11. Banks, stock markets, and growth: robustness check (Interaction terms)
Dependent Variable: Per capita real GDP growth rate
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank credit
-7.177 -6.514*** -6.349 -7.915 -7.153***
(7.573) (2.300) (3.980) (7.247) (2.064)
Turnover ratio
1.545 1.126 0.735 1.792 0.982
(4.119) (1.103) (1.843) (4.731) (0.969)
MIC x Bank credit
12.435* 11.883*** 11.536*** 13.045* 12.179***
(6.988) (2.273) (4.007) (6.943) (2.162)
MIC x Turnover ratio
-2.386 -1.714 -1.076 -2.863 -1.58
(6.709) (1.706) (2.695) (7.132) (1.432)
Initial income
1.392 2.203 3.103 0.634 1.66
(10.010) (3.791) (3.376) (7.518) (3.806)
Schooling
-2.908 -4.225 -5.672 -1.834 -3.284
(16.912) (5.244) (7.596) (11.426) (5.31)
Govt. cons.
0.218 0.801
(3.250) (3.003)
Inflation
-2.044 -1.464
(3.046) (1.570)
Trade openness
0.075 -0.989
(7.982) (2.920)
Dummy 1999-2003
0.172 0.169 0.088 0.225 0.257
(0.493) (0.495) (0.500) (0.918) (0.651)
Dummy 2004-’08
2.054** 2.025** 1.984** 2.19 2.341**
(0.890) (0.833) (0.856) (1.858) (1.144)
Dummy 2009-’12
0.220 -0.010 -0.188 0.502 0.353
(2.547) (1.178) (1.413) (1.926) (1.544)
Constant
20.012 13.045 8.937 27.034 22.247
(78.687) (28.031) (28.577) (58.549) (39.250)
Observations 189 189 189 189 189
No.of countries 64 64 64 64 64
Instruments 12 14 14 14 18
AR(2) testa 0.171 0.159 0.233 0.259 0.215
Hansen J testb 0.756 0.947 0.907 0.933 0.985
Diff-in-Han. testb 0.756 0.988 0.734 0.722 0.85
Wald test of 0.194 0.023 0.044 0.070 0.003
joint sig.
Notes: Notes: All regressions are two-step panel GMM for all countries, incorporating Windmeijer (2005)
correction, with robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. All variables are in log form.P-values of the post-estimation tests are
reported;(a)The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order
serial correlation;(b)The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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Table I.12. Banks, stock markets, and growth: robustness check (Interaction terms)
Dependent Variable: Per capita real GDP growth rate
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private credit
-12.135* -7.468*** -9.221** -12.378* -7.568***
(6.562) (2.203) (3.806) (6.417) (1.974)
Traded value
3.447 1.055 1.701 3.598 1.038
(3.741) (1.108) (1.659) (3.187) (1.009)
MIC x Private credit
15.867*** 12.224*** 13.415*** 15.857*** 12.127***
(5.699) (2.147) (2.897) (5.337) (2.040)
MIC x Traded value
-4.849 -1.298 -2.154 -4.804 -1.333
(5.416) (1.436) (2.125) (4.521) (1.208)
Initial income
-1.930 2.095 1.792 -0.499 1.967
(6.015) (3.411) (2.213) (5.122) (2.991)
Schooling
4.827 -3.134 -1.044 2.460 -2.88
(10.282) (4.800) (5.406) (8.753) (4.408)
Govt. cons.
-0.086 0.582
(3.472) (2.847)
Inflation
-1.324 -2.083
(1.935) (1.786)
Trade openness
2.189 -0.646
(3.837) (2.333)
Dummy 1999-2003
-0.557 0.066 -0.279 -0.799 0.032
(0.949) (0.524) (0.722) (1.087) (0.586)
Dummy 2004-’08
1.574 1.830** 1.558 1.008 1.871*
(1.174) (0.884) (0.942) (1.569) (1.041)
Dummy 2009-’12
1.122 -0.032 0.034 0.528 -0.012
(1.982) (1.097) (1.125) (1.956) (1.192)
Constant
52.334 17.957 21.749 34.651 20.147
(52.578) (24.87) (22.684) (50.020) (28.736)
Observations 189 189 189 189 189
No. of countries 64 64 64 64 64
Instruments 12 14 14 14 18
AR(2) testa 0.245 0.156 0.218 0.187 0.183
Hansen J testb 0.925 0.662 0.74 0.913 0.922
Diff-in-Han. testb 0.925 0.547 0.439 0.677 0.982
Wald test of 0.049 0.002 0.009 0.033 0.0002
joint sig.
Notes: Notes: All regressions are two-step panel GMM for all countries, incorporating Windmeijer (2005)
correction, with robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. All variables are in log form.P-values of the post-estimation tests are
reported;(a)The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order
serial correlation;(b)The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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CHAPTER II
ESSAY 2: FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC
GROWTH, AND CONVERGENCE CLUBS
II.1 INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to re-examine the role of financial -both stock markets and banking system-
development in economic growth for a sample of 40 countries and the period 1989-2012 using a
system approach with more homogeneous country sub-groups.
The finance-growth relationship has been the subject of continuous debate since the pioneering
works of Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1934), and the later works of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon
(1973), and Shaw (1973). In particular, the King and Levine (1993a, b) study into the effects of
financial development on economic growth has rekindled the interest in the subject and ever since
there have been voluminous studies that examine the relationship between finance and growth.
However, there is no theoretical as well as empirical consensus regarding the role financial develop-
ment plays in economic growth.
On the one hand, a substantial body of the theoretical literature argues that better function-
ing financial system plays a proactive role in economic growth through enhancement of resource
allocation (e.g. Bencivenga & Smith, 1991; Bencivenga, Smith, & Starr, 1995; Bertocco, 2008;
Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Khan, 2001; King & Levine, 1993a; and Morales, 2003). On the
other hand, some studies contend that financial sector develops merely in response to increased
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demand for financial services generated by economic growth (Robinson, 1952) or has no significant
contribution to growth (Lucas, 1988)14. At the same time, the literature debates the comparative
importance of banks and securities markets in economic activity. While some studies debate that
banks are relatively better (e.g. Allen & Gale, 1997, Boot & Thakor, 1997; Stiglitz, 1985), others
(including Boyd & Smith, 1998; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993) argue well-functioning markets are
better at improving resource allocation and hence fostering economic growth. Still others (e.g.
Levine, 1997; Merton & Bodie, 1995; Song & Thakor, 2012) emphasize on creating well-functioning
banks and markets rather than on making a choice between the two. Theory also stresses that the
relative merits of banks and markets varies with the stages of growth of countries, where banks
have a significant contribution to growth at early stages of growth and securities markets become
relatively more important as countries grow economically (e.g. Boot & Thakor, 1997; Boyd &
Smith, 1998; Song & Thakor, 2012).
Empirical evidence concerning the role of financial development in economic growth is also incon-
clusive. Many cross-country and panel data studies mainly assess the role of banks, without also
including stock markets, in boosting economic growth (Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000; Bordo &
Rousseau, 2012; Deidda & Fattouh, 2002; Favara, 2003; King & Levine, 1993a, b; Levine, Loayza,
& Beck, 2000; Loayza & Ranciere, 2006; Rioja & Valev, 2004; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2002, among
others). In the absence of control for stock markets, it is difficult to assess if financial interme-
diaries and markets have independent effects on growth and if the relationship between financial
intermediaries and growth still holds after controlling for stock market development. A number of
empirical works, including but not limited to Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2012); Beck and Levine
(2004); Deidda and Fattouh (2008); Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2013); Levine and Zervos
(1998); Rousseau and Wachtel (2000, 2011); and Saci, Giorgioni, and Holden (2009) attempt to
overcome this shortcoming by simultaneously examining the causal effects of stock markets and
banks on growth. Although some of the studies employ better statistical techniques than others
to identify the causal effect of banks and stock markets on growth, most of them pool together
heterogeneous countries and assess the causal effects of banks and markets on growth in one pass.
This may not be very informative as it is likely that financial intermediaries and markets may have
14Levine (1997, 2005) and Beck (2011, 2013) provide thorough review of the literature.
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quite different impacts on growth depending on the structural characteristics, including stage of
economic development, of the countries concerned.
Panel regressions that do not attempt to account for heterogeneity of cross-sectional observations
conceal the likely differential growth effects of financial development that emanate from differences
in the structural characteristics and stages of economic development of countries, among other
factors. As a result, these studies will have less policy relevance. Few of the studies that find
evidence of a differential effects of financial depth on growth include Arcand et al., 2012; Deidda
and Fattouh, 2002; and Rioja and Valev, 2004. Rioja and Valev (2004), dividing countries into
three regions-as low, medium, and high financial development regions depending on if the ratio of
the private credit to GDP is below 14%, between 14-30%, and above 30%, respectively, show that
while there is no statistically significant relationship between financial depth and growth in low
regions, there is a positive and statistically significant, albeit declining, effect of financial depth on
growth in the middle and high regions. Arcand et al. (2012) also show that intermediate levels
of financial depth have positive effect on growth, but very high levels, measured by private credit
to GDP ratio in excess of 80%, can lead to deterioration of growth15. These studies indicate the
difficulty of setting clear cut threshold levels of financial development indicators in analyzing the
non-monotone effects of financial development on growth (note that the highest level of private
credit to GDP ratio for “high regions” is set at in excess of 37% in Rioja and Valev whereas the
corresponding value is in excess of 80% in Arcand et al.)16.
Against this backdrop, this study attempts to assess the possibly differential growth effects of
financial- both stock markets and banking system- development for a panel of 40 countries over
the period 1989-2012. Towards this goal, we proceed in two steps. First, we apply a regression
based club convergence test, suggested by Phillips and Sul (Econometrica, 75(6): 1771-1855, 2007),
to examine if countries can be sorted into more homogeneous subgroups based on the transitional
behavior of their respective per capita real GDP. In the second part, we apply dynamic panel GMM
15Deidda and Fattouh (2002) also, using threshold regression, show that financial depth has a positive and statis-
tically significant growth impact only beyond a certain threshold level.
16The challenge is more vivid if we have to use different indicators of financial development as there is no single
best indicator of financial development in a country.
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and traditional GMM to investigate the effects of stock markets and banks development on eco-
nomic growth of each convergence club. Specifically, this study differs from others in three ways:
(1) it controls for both stock markets and banks and employs the most recent available annual data
set to a group of 40 countries over the period 1989-2012; (2) it employs regression based conver-
gence test, suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007), henceforth PS, to test if subgroup of countries
exhibit similar convergence patterns and hence form convergence clubs. This method has numerous
advantages over other convergence tests. It can accommodate cases where a long-run co-movement
between series exists irrespective of the existence of cointegration between the series, whereas the
conventional cointegration and unit root tests will typically have low power in detecting the asymp-
totic co-movement between series; it is based on a general nonlinear time-varying factor model and
can detect convergence even in cases of temporary divergence or heterogeneity unlike conventional
stationarity tests; it does not rely on any particular assumption regarding trend stationarity or
stochastic non-stationarity; even in cases of rejection of the null hypothesis of full panel conver-
gence to a common steady state, the methodology allows us to identify if countries convergence
to multiple steady states at the same time or if they diverge; (3) it applies both dynamic panel
GMM and traditional GMM to a system of growth equations of more homogeneous convergence
clubs identified in the study to produce more policy relevant findings. The dynamic panel GMM
model controls for simultaneity, omitted variable bias and endogeneity issues. Econometric theory
also shows that the traditional GMM applied to a system of growth equations of relatively homo-
geneous countries, with cross-equation restrictions, produces more efficient outcomes compared to
panel regression methods as it utilizes more information in the variance-covariance matrix of the
residuals; it continuously updates the estimates until some sort of convergence has been achieved;
allows us to correct for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms; and it does
not depend on any strong distributional assumption.
The club convergence test identifies four convergence clubs, two each for HICs and MICs. Both dy-
namic panel and traditional GMM regression results show that financial development, particularly
banking system development, has differential growth impact depending on the fundamentals and
stages of development of the countries analyzed. The regression results show that (i) size of credits
issued to the private sector and stock market liquidity have strong positive impacts on economic
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growth of the two clubs of MICs (Clubs 3 & 4); (ii) while stock market liquidity exerts robust and
positive influence on both clubs of HICs, the effects of credits differ. For Club1 of HICs -mainly
European countries- credit issued to private sector is found to strongly enhance economic growth.
For Club2 of HICs, including some of the most advanced economies with most active and largest
stock markets and banks- USA, Japan, Australia, and Great Britain, to mention a few-credits ex-
tended to the private sector can undermine economic growth.
Our finding of differential growth impact of financial development, particularly of banking system
development, is in line with the findings of recent panel studies, including Arcand et al. (2012) and
Rioja and Valev (2004) that also conclude that financial deepening has a non-monotone growth
effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides information about the data and
measurement, while section 3 presents concepts of panel unit-root tests and test results. Section
4 introduces Log t club convergence test and provides the test results. Section 5 discusses the
empirical regression models and the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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II.2 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
II.2.1 The Data
To examine the potentially different growth impacts of financial -both stock markets and banking
system- development, we employ a panel of 40 Countries for which we have complete stock market
data for the period 1989-2012. The dataset includes both High-income (19) and Middle-income (21)
countries. We use annual data that allows us to exploit the time-series dimensions of the data and
analyze both the high frequency relationship between financial development and economic growth
and the long-run behavior of real per capita income of the countries. The source of the financial
system indicators is the World Bank’s “Financial Structure and Development data Base”17 whereas
all the control variables, with the exception of schooling which is from Barro & Lee’s (2010) data
base, are from the electronic version of World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
II.2.1.1 Financial system indicators
Well-functioning financial systems mitigate market frictions and spur economic growth though pro-
vision of information about investment opportunities, monitoring of investments, diversification
and sharing of risks, pooling and mobilization of savings, and facilitation of exchange of goods
and services. However, there is no one best indicator that shows the extent to which banks and
stock markets provide these services across a number of countries. As a result, we rely on multiple
standard measures of the size and activity of banks and stock markets18.
17Whenever available, the financial system indicators are updated using the original sources: Standard & Poor’s
Emerging Stock Markets/ Global Stock Markets Factbook for stock market measures, and IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics Yearbook for banking system measures.
18Indicators employed by King & Levine (1993) and all major studies thereafter.
68
To measure stock market development, we use three measures: TURNOVER RATIO, VALUE
TRADED, and MARKET CAPITALIZATION. TURNOVER RATIO equals the value of the traded
shares in domestic stock market divided by total value of listed shares, and it measures liquidity of
the stock market relative to its size. TRADED VALUE equals the value of all (domestic) shares
traded in the (domestic) stock market divided by GDP, and it measures how active the stock mar-
ket is relative to the size of the economy. MARKET CAPITALIZATION equals the total value of
listed shares in the stock market divided by GDP, and it measures the size of the market relative
to the economy. Theory predicts that more liquid/active markets facilitate efficient allocation of
resources and foster growth.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the indicators. As we can see, there is a huge cross-country
variation in these measures. For instance, the turnover ratio averages about 60% (82% in HICs
and 40.8% in MICs), where Luxembourg had the minimum value of 0.145% in 2011 and Pakistan
had the maximum value of 497% in 2003. The traded value also varies from a minimum of 0.017%
in Nigeria in 1989 to a maximum of 435% in USA in 2008, with the average equal to 40% for the
full sample (63% in HICs and 19% in MICS). The average size of the stock market is about 61% of
GDP (75.4% in HICS and 47.5% in MICS). In general, the HICS have the largest and most active
stock markets while the lower MICS have the least active markets, relative to the total sample.
To measure banking system development, we use BANK CREDIT, PRIVATE CREDIT, and LIQ-
UID LIABILITIES. BANK CREDIT equals total credit extended by deposit money banks to the
private sector as a share of GDP. It excludes credits by other financial institutions and to the
government and public enterprises. PRIVATE CREDIT equals credit issued by deposit banks and
other financial institutions (excluding central banks) to the private sector divided by GDP. These
two measures were almost identical until the late 1990s but they started diverging at the beginning
of the new millennium (Arcand et al. 2012). Higher levels of each could represent higher levels of
financial services to the private sector and thus greater financial intermediary development. How-
ever, it could also show over-lending, which could deter growth.
LIQUID LIABILITIES equals the ratio of liquid liabilities of financial system (currency plus de-
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mand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial institutions) to GDP or the ratio
of broad money to GDP (M3/GDP). It measures the overall size of the financial intermediary sec-
tor. This measure is commonly used in the literature under the assumption that the size of the
sector is directly correlated with the financial services it renders. However, it does not necessarily
measure the degree to which financial institutions overcome the adverse effects of information asym-
metry and transaction costs and provide effective service. All the financial system indicators are
deflated by end-of-period prices and their average is divided by GDP that is deflated by annual CPI.
A look at Table 1 shows the variation in banking system measures across the sample. The bank
credit, for example, averages about 69% of GDP (100% in HICs and about 41% in MICs), with the
minimum credit of about 7% issued by deposit banks in Peru in 1991 and the maximum amount
of about 224% extended by banks in Denmark in 2009. The private credit also averages about
76% of GDP (110.5% and 45.5% in HICs and MICs, respectively). Liquid liabilities ranges from a
minimum of 8.6% in Peru in 1989 to a maximum of 399% in Luxembourg in 2008, with the average
being 74% (100% in HICs and 51% in MICs).
II.2.1.2 Other variables
As is standard in the literature on finance-growth nexus, we include the following control variables
that have been shown empirically to have robust growth effects: lagged values of real per capita
GDP to capture the tendency for growth rates to converge across countries and overtime and also
to control for serial correlation; average years of schooling in population 25 years of age or older to
control for human capital accumulation; the ratio of total government final consumption expendi-
ture (government size) & inflation rate-CPI (both measure macroeconomic stability); and sum of
imports and exports as a fraction of GDP (trade openness).
The correlation tables (Tables 2 and 3) show that for MICs growth is positively correlated with
all financial measures and the correlation is significant in the case of all stock market measures.
On the other hand, all banking system measures are negatively and significantly correlated with
growth while stock market traded value and market capitalization are positively and significantly
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correlated with growth in the case of the HICs19. Summary statistics for individual countries is
given in Table 4.
19At the same time, the banking system and stock market measures are generally significantly correlated to each
other for both sets of countries (especially in the case of MICs), implying that our model that controls for both bank
and stock markets measures may offer conservative estimates of the role of banks and stock markets in economic
growth than if only one measure is used as a regressor.
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II.3 PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST
II.3.1 The Model
Before we analyze the presence of converging income clubs and a long-run relationship between
financial development and economic growth, we first test for the presence of unit roots in the
cross-sectional units of our panel using panel unit root test procedures. The panel unit root tests
combine both the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of the data and hence are superior to
the univariate unit root test procedures, which suffer from low power.
Let yit be the observation on the i
th cross-section unit at time t and assume it evolves according
to:
yit = ηi + xit (1)
xit = φi xit−1 + µit (2)
Where i = 1, 2, ..., N ; t = 1, 2, ..., Ti. ηi represents deterministic component including any individual
intercepts (or individual time-trends or both) and φi is the cross-section specific autoregressive
coefficient.
Combining equations (1) and (2), we can have the expression for the observable variables:
yit = φi yit−1 + (1− φi)ηi + µit (3)
A test for the presence of a unit root in our panel is represented by the null hypothesis H0 : φi = 1
for all i against the possibly heterogeneous alternatives, H1 : φi < 1,i = 1, 2, ..., N1;φi = 1,i =
N1 + 1,N1 + 2, ..., N.
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The classical panel unit root tests, also known as the first generation panel unit root tests, assume
independent units yit; i.e; the individual time-series in the panel are assumed to be cross-sectionally
independently distributed. If the panel features cross-section dependence, the first generation tests
suffer from serious size distortions (Pesaran, 2007; Strauss & Yigit, 2003 demonstrate some exam-
ples). Economic variables, including real per capita GDP, are often characterized by co-movement
and there are a number of causes for cross-section dependence in our panel: global common shocks
with heterogeneous impact across countries, such as the global financial crisis from 2007 onwards,
or local spillover effects between countries or regions. The ample empirical evidence on the pres-
ence of cross-section dependence led to the rejection of the first generation tests, which are based
on restrictive assumptions particularly in the context of heterogeneous panels with cross-section
dependence, in favor of what is termed as the second generation panel unit root tests that allow
for cross-sectional dependence among units of our panel.
Pesaran proposes a panel unit root test procedure that accounts for cross-sectional dependence
among the units of a panel as follows: He builds on the assumption that the error terms µit in
equation (3) follow a single common factor structure:
µit = γi ft+ it (4)
Where ft, the unobserved common effect, is always assumed to be stationary and impacts the
cross-section time-series with a fraction determined by the individual specific factor loading γi.
it, the individual specific (idiosyncratic) error are assumed to be i.i.d. across i and t with
E(it) = 0, E(it)
2 = σ2i and E(it)
4 < ∞. Furthermore, it, ft and γi are mutually indepen-
dently distributed for all i.
Equations (3) and (4) can be written as:
∆yit = αi + βi yit−1 + γi ft + it (5)
Where, αi(1 − φi)ηi, βi = −(1 − φi) and ∆yit = yit − yit−1. The unit root hypothesis of interest,
φi = 1, can now be expressed as:
H0 : βi = 0 for all i (6)
Against the possibly heterogeneous alternatives,
H1 : βi < 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N1;βi = 0, i = N1 + 1, N1 + 2, ..., N (7)
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Thus, the cross-section dependence arises due to the common factor, which can be approximated
by the cross-section mean y¯t = N
−1∑N
i=1 yit.
Pesaran (2007) proposes the cross-sectionally augumented Dickey-Fuller regression (CADF) based
on the following equation:
∆yit = αi + biyit−1 + ciyt−1 +
p∑
j=0
dij∆yt−j +
p∑
j=1
δij∆yit−j + eit (8)
That is, CADF asymptotically filters out the unobserved common factor by augmenting the stan-
dard ADF with the cross-section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual
series20.
The test for the presence of a unit root can now be conducted on the basis of the t-values of bi
either individually or in a combined fashion. The first statistic is denoted as CADFi statistic while
the latter resembles the familiar IPS statistic of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and is constructed
as:
CIPS= N−1
∑N
i=1CADF i (9)
That is, using the t˜i t-statistic for bi, the cross-sectionally augmented version of the IPS test (known
as CIPS) is constructed as:
CIPS(N,T)=t¯ =N−1
∑N
i=1 t˜i(N,T ) (10)
Pesaran investigates the performance of the CADFi and CIPS tests by means of Monte Carlo
simulations and shows that these tests have satisfactory size and power even for relatively small
values of N and T, i.e., even in the case of N=T=10. Pesaran also provides critical values based
on simulations for the CADF and CIPS-distributions for three cases (no intercept and no trend,
intercept only, intercept and trend). Due to this small sample properties, we find Pesaran test
appealing for application to the present study.
20The ADF test takes potential serial correlation in the error term into account by introducing lagged terms of the
dependent variable.
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II.3.2 Test Results
Table 5 depicts CIPS unit root test results, with IPS test results also included for comparison. As
can be seen, the CIPS test-for the full sample and the two income groups- shows that all variables
contain unit roots, with the exception of schooling variable21 . The IPS test also shows presence of
unit roots in all of the banking system and stock market measures for the full sample and the two
income groups, with the exception of rejection of the null of unit roots in stock market capitalization
for the full sample and MICs, and in turnover ratio for MICs. The IPS test also rejects the null of
unit roots in inflation and trade openness for all country groups.
21The schooling data is only available for every five year period and does not show much variation over time.
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II.4 Log t CLUB CONVERGENCE TEST
II.4.1 Concepts of Convergence
The growth literature identifies three complementary and competing hypotheses of convergence:
σ-convergence (sigma), β-convergence (Beta), and club convergence (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992,
2004; Galor, 1996; Sala-i-Martin, 1996). σ-convergence refers to the tendency for the dispersion
of per capita real income across groups of economies to fall over time (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). This
concept refers to the decline in cross-country inequality in per capita real income. β-convergence
implies that in the long-run, independent of initial conditions, per capita incomes of countries con-
verge to one another. This β-convergence can be absolute or conditional. Absolute β-convergence
postulates that poor economies tend to grow faster per capita than rich ones, without conditioning
on any other characteristics of economies. Conditional β-convergence, however, argues that conver-
gence takes place only if we allow for heterogeneity across economies; i.e., convergence is conditional
on the converging countries having similar structural characteristics (production technology, pref-
erences, government policies, etc) (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). We say there is β-convergence in
a cross-section of economies if we find a negative relationship between the growth rate of per capita
income and the initial level of income. Hence, while σ-convergence studies how the distribution of
income evolves over time, β-convergence studies the mobility of income within the same distribu-
tion (Sala-i-Martin, 1996).
Club convergence hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that per capita incomes of countries con-
verge to one another in the long-run provided that the countries have both similar structural char-
acteristics and initial conditions (Galor, 1996). This hypothesis implies that although economies
are similar in their structural characteristics, they may however converge to different steady state
equilibria if they differ in their initial conditions. In the words of Galor, “...countries with similar
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fundamentals that are in the same basin of attraction to a given steady-state equilibrium will con-
verge in the long run”. The economies that approach the same steady state equilibrium are said to
form a convergence club. According to Galor, while conditional convergence imply a globally stable,
steady-state equilibrium, club convergence implies multiple locally stable steady-state equilibria.
A number of econometric techniques have been used to test the club convergence hypothesis. In
early studies, the conventional β-convergence was used with subsets of countries and estimates were
compared against convergence rates of the full sample. For instance, Durlauf and Johnson (1995)
cluster countries into subgroups based on the countries’ initial level of income and human capital
and compare the β-convergence tests of each group to the overall sample to identify existence of
multiple regimes. The problem in attempting to test for club convergence in this manner arises
from the difficulty of obtaining grouping criteria that are exogenous to the determinants of steady
state as differences in the latter can also lead to differences in equilibrium (Islam, 2003). The con-
ventional β-convergence, estimated using augmented Solow regression, also results in biased and
inconsistent estimates in the presence of heterogeneous technological progress, as it treats techno-
logical change as part of the error term, which could be correlated with the explanatory variables
and hence suffer from omitted variable and endogeneity biases (Islam, 2003; Phillips & Sul, 2009).
Recent developments in club convergence tests identify clubs via endogenized groupings, where fac-
tors that may have led to multiple steady states are left unspecified (e.g. Hobijn & Franses, 2000;
Phillips & Sul, 2007). This way, we avoid the challenge of a priori identifying exogenous clustering
criteria. This latter method also focuses on the cross-sectional distribution of per capita income
levels, which is analogous to the notion of σ-convergence22, and hence focus us on detecting if
economies converge toward one another, unlike the β-convergence where we focus on within dimen-
sion of economy23. One such method involves the use of cointegration and unit-root tests, which
is based on the examination of the time-series properties of log-level inter-economy differences in
22Phillips and Sul (2007) discuss that existing convergence tests based on the concept of σ-convergence claim
under growth convergence the cross-sectional variance should be stationary; however, this cross-sectional variance
can manifest non-stationary characteristics depending on whether the individual convergence rate is slower or faster
than the divergence rate of the common growth factor.
23Quah (1996) also argues for methods that focus on the cross-sectional distribution of variable and suggests the
distributional approach based on Kernel density estimation.
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per capita income. Although these tests may not support cointegration between two series, it does
not mean there is an absence of co-movement or convergence between the series. Specifically, the
conventional cointegration tests (e.g. Hobijn & Franses, 2000) will typically have low power in
detecting the asymptotic co-movement and hence may erroneously reject the convergence hypoth-
esis24.
The logt convergence test, a regression based convergence test suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007)
(discussed below), on the other hand, accommodates cases where a long-run co-movement in series
exists regardless of the existence of cointegration. This method can be interpreted as an asymptotic
cointegration test that does not suffer from the small sample problems of conventional cointegra-
tion and unit-root tests (Panopoulou & Pantelidis, 2009). The methodology also has numerous
other advantages over existing convergence tests. Given that it is based on a general nonlinear
time-varying factor model, it can detect convergence even in cases of transitional divergence or
heterogeneity, where as other methods like stationarity tests fail. The methodology also does not
rely on any specific assumption regarding trend stationarity or stochastic non-stationarity. As we
will see below, in case of rejection of the null of full panel convergence to a common steady state,
the methodology allows us to identify if countries converge to multiple steady states at the same
time or if they diverge.
II.4.2 Log t Convergence Test
II.4.2.1 The model
We analyze the transitional behavior of per capita real income among 40 countries for the period
1989-2012 by means of a regression based convergence test, developed by Phillips and Sul (Econo-
metrica, 75(6): 1771-1855, 2007) (henceforth PS).
Let us represent log of per capita real GDP by the variable Xit, where i = 1, 2, ..., N and t =
1, 2, ..., T denote the number of countries and the time period, respectively. Xit is decomposed into
two components, one systematic, git, and the other transitory, ait, as follows:
Xit = git + ait (11)
24See Phillips and Sul (2007) for further detail.
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Specification (11) may contain a mixture of both common and idiosyncratic components in the two
elements and PS transform it so as to separate these common and idiosyncratic components in our
panel as follows:
Xit = (
git+ait
µt
)µt = δitµt for all i and t (12)
Where µt is a common component and δit is a time-varying idiosyncratic element. The idiosyncratic
component, δit, measures the relative share in common trend component, µt, of country i at time
t (or is a measure of economic distance between Xit and common trend component µt).
This representation enables testing convergence by testing whether the factor loading δit converges
to a constant, δ, by taking ratios instead of differences and thus factoring out the common trend
component. That is, PS construct the relative transition coefficient, hit, as
hit =
Xit
N−1
∑N
i=1Xit
= δit
N−1
∑N
i=1 δit
(13)
hit measures the transition path for real GDP per capita of country i relative to the panel average
at time t. By construction, the cross-section mean of hit is unity. Besides, if the factor loading
coefficients δit converge to δ, then the relative transition parameters hit converge to unity and the
cross-sectional variance of hit (Ht) converges to zero as t→∞:
Ht = N
−1∑N
i=1(hit−1)
2 → 0 as t→∞ (14)
In order to specify the null hypothesis of convergence PS model δit in a semiparametric form that
allows for heterogeneity over time and across countries as:
δit = δi +
σiξit
L(t)tα (15)
Where δi is fixed, σi is an idiosyncratic scale parameter, ξit is iid (0,1) across i, L(t) is a slow
varying function, such as log(t) for which L(t) → ∞ as t → ∞, and α is a decay rate, the rate at
which cross-sectional variation over the transitions decays to zero over time. One role of L(t) in
(15) is to ensure that convergence holds even when α = 0, although likely at a slow rate.
The formulation ensures that δit converges to δi for α ≥ 0, which therefore becomes a null hypoth-
esis of interest, which can be written as:
H0 : δi = δ and α ≥ 0 against the alternative
HA : δi 6= δ for some i and/or α < 0 (16)
The null hypothesis implies convergence for all countries, which includes different transitional
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patterns- including temporary divergence and heterogeneity, for economies i and j25 . The al-
ternative hypothesis implies no convergence for some countries and can accommodate either overall
divergence or club convergence. PS show that under convergence, Ht has the following limiting
form:
Ht ∼ AL(t)2t2α , as t→∞ (17)
Where A is a strictly positive constant.
To test for convergence, PS suggest first constructing the cross-sectional variance ratio (H1/Ht),
where H1 (for t = 1) represents variation at the beginning of the sample and Ht, variation for
every point in time (t = 1, 2, ..., T ). The authors take log of this ratio to measure the distance of
the panel from the common limit and then test the null hypothesis in the context of the following
regression, which they label ‘log t’ convergence test ( as the t-statistic refers to the coefficient of
the logt regressor in the equation):
log(H1/Ht)− 2logL(t) = aˆ+ bˆlogt+ µˆt (18)
For t = [rT ], [rT ] + 1, ..., T , where L(t) = log(t) and r > 0.
r denotes a fraction of the initial sample that is removed before running the regression so as to min-
imize the effects of the initial conditions and hence focus on the latter part of the sample data26.
Based on extensive Monte carlo simulations, PS suggest using r = 0.3 for sample sizes beneath
T=50, as it is satisfactory in terms of both size and power properties of the test. The second term
on the left, -2log L(t), plays the role of a penalty function and improves test performance27.
Under the null hypothesis of convergence, the fitted coefficient on log t, bˆ, converges in probability
to the scaled speed of convergence parameter 2αˆ, where αˆ is the estimate of α in H0. The t-statistic
in our regression is constructed in the usual way using HAC standard errors and we apply a one-
sided t-test to test the inequality of the null hypothesis α ≥ 028. We reject the null hypothesis if
25That is, this method by PS enables to detect convergence even in case of temporary divergence, where other
methods like conventional cointegration tests fail. For detail, refer Phillips and Sul (2007).
26Phillips and Sul (2007) argue that “This data trimming focuses attention on the latter part of the sample data,
validates the regression equation in terms of the asymptotic representation of the transition distance, and ensures
test consistency in growth convergence applications”.
27Inclusion of the term, -2 log L(t), serves as a penalty that helps the test on the coefficient of the log t regressor
to discriminate the behavior of the dependent variable under the alternative from that under the null.
28Since α is a scalar, the null can be tested using a simple one-sided t-test.
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tbˆ < −1.65 (5% significance level).
If the null of convergence is rejected for the overall sample, we proceed to examine if subgroups
of countries form convergence clubs employing the club convergence algorithm suggested by PS.
The algorithm has four steps, which are briefly described below (Appendix III.3 provides detailed
description from Phillips & Sul, 2007). First, we order the countries in descending order due to
the final income or the average of the last half period of incomes. Second, by means of the logt
test, we form a core group of countries. Third, we sieve the data for new club members, where we
add one country at a time to the core group and run logt test until we form a convergence club for
which tbˆ is larger than -1.65. Fourth, we run the logt test for the countries not selected in step 3
and see if tbˆ > −1.65 on this group. If so, conclude that there are two convergence clubs. If not,
repeat steps 1 to 3 to see if the remaining countries can be subdivided into convergence clusters.
If no convergence clubs are found, conclude that those countries diverge.
II.4.2.2 Test results
When applying the logt regression test29to the log of real GDP per capita of 40 countries over the
period 1989-2012, the null hypothesis of full panel convergence is rejected at the 5% significance
level. As can be seen in panel A of Table 6, the point estimate of b, -3.210, and the corresponding
t-statistics show that the parameter is significantly less than zero, implying that countries do not
converge to a single common steady state. As a result, we proceed to the implementation of the
club convergence algorithm described above to examine if there are any subgroup of countries that
converge. The results, presented in Panel A of Table 6, indicate two converging clubs and no evi-
dence of diverging countries.
As can be seen, the two clubs consist of 22 & 18 member countries, respectively, and there is an
apparent regularity in membership. The HICs tend to cluster with other HICs and the MICs with
other MICs. 68% & 32% members of club1 are MICs and HICs, whereas 33% & 67% of members
29Given that our focus is the long run behavior of per capita real GDP, we first remove the business cycle component
of our data using the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing filter (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997), as suggested by Phillips & Sul
(2007).
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of club2 are MICs and HICs, respectively30. Based on this, we first categorize our data set into two
income groups- HICs and MICs, and then apply the logt regression to examine if convergence pat-
terns appear under each income group. Grouping our data set into clusters with similar economic
characteristics also makes sense given that we, in the next chapter, attempt to explore the possibly
differential effects of financial development on economic growth.
Once again, we first employ the logt test to a panel of 19 HICs and 21 MICs to detect if all countries
in each income group converge to their respective common steady states. The results, presented
in Panels B and C of Table 6, indicate that full panel convergence does not hold for either income
group. Subsequently, we proceed to the convergence club classification procedure, where the al-
gorithm classifies each income group into two clusters with no country that diverges. For HICs,
countries in Club1 converge at a higher rate than countries in Club2 and have a relatively smaller
real GDP per capita than members of Club2. Club1 Members of MICs (which includes some of
the fast growing countries like Brazil, India, and Republic of South Africa, which form part of the
BRICS countries) also converge at a much higher rate and have a smaller real GDP per capita than
their counterparts in Club2. Generally, the highest convergence rate belongs to the MICs (Club1).
Next, we examine whether neighboring members of each club for each income group exhibit a ten-
dency for transitioning between clubs. For this purpose we apply logt test to λ1 fraction of the
lower income members in the upper club together with λ2 fraction (we set λ1 = λ2 = 0.5, when
feasible) of the higher income members in the lower club,following Phillips and Sul (2009). The
results are presented in the last rows of Panels B and C. As indicated, there is no evidence of
transitioning between clubs for the MICs (bˆ = -0.557, tbˆ = -25.550). However, the results support
transitioning between clubs for the HICs (bˆ = 0.001, tbˆ = 0.022). This latter finding may imply
either the tendency for some countries to move from one convergence club to the other or that the
clubs are slowly converging to one another, a possibility which seems to be confirmed by the tran-
sition paths of the clubs (depicted in Figure 1). Phillips and Sul (2009) find similar results in their
analysis of the transition behavior of per capita income of 152 countries over the period 1970 to 2003.
30We also test if the 31.8% of HICs in club1 can form a convergence club with the 33.3% of MICs in club2 to examine
transitioning between groups and the logt coefficient, -0.770, and t-stat -45.091, reject the null of convergence between
the two.
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Figures 1 and 2 display the relative transition paths of log real GDP per capita for the two clubs of
HICs and MICs, respectively, computed as the cross-sectional mean of the relative transition paths
of the members of each club, after eliminating business cycle components31. As can be seen, there
is a marked heterogeneity in the relative transition paths of these two groups of countries. In case
of HICs, although there was heterogeneity between the two clubs at the start of the study period,
there is a clear reduction in dispersion of the transition curves over time, as both curves narrow
towards unity over time. In the case of MICs, however, the dispersion is continuously widening and
there is evidence of further divergence in the transition paths of the two clubs.
31Following Phillips and Sul (2007), we employ Hodrick-Prescott smoothing filter which is suitable when the time
series are short and is also flexible as it requires only the input of a smoothing parameter and no prior specification
of the nature of the common trend in per capita real GDP.
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II.5 METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
II.5.1 The Model
To assess whether stock markets and banks have economically and statistically significant causal
effects on economic growth, we employ a modified version of Barro (1991) growth model of the form:
yi,t =
∑p
j=1 αjyi,t−j +Wi,tγ + τt + µi + i,t ; (19)
Where, yi,t is the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, Wi,t is a set of explanatory
variables, including measures of stock markets and bank development,τt stands for time-specific ef-
fects, µi represents time invariant country-specific effects, and i,t is the idiosyncratic shocks.
With some modification, (19) becomes:
∆yi,t = (α1 − 1)yi,t−1 +
∑p
j=2 αjyi,t−j +Wi,tγ + τt + µi + i,t; (20)
The lagged values of real per capita GDP (yi,t−j) enter the right-hand side to control for serial cor-
relation, with different lag length (p) for each country group32. To remove the unobserved common
time effects, which are correlated with lagged real per capita GDP, we cross-sectionally demean all
the variables.
We apply dynamic panel system GMM and traditional GMM models to (20) with cross-sectionally
demeaned data. Although we remove the common time-effects from the model, the lagged per
capita income and other controls could still be correlated with the error term. To overcome this
32The lag length for each country group is determined using General-to-specific decision criterion.
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endogeneity issue, our regression models employ valid instruments.
II.5.1.1 Dynamic panel system GMM
After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, (20) can be rewritten as:
yi,t = α1yi,t−1 +
∑p
j=2 αjyi,t−j +Wi,tγ + µi + i,t; (21)
Dynamic panel system GMM removes the time-invariant country fixed effects by taking first dif-
ference of (21) as follows:
∆yi,t = α1∆yi,t−1 +
∑p
j=2 αj∆yi,t−j + ∆Wi,tγ + ∆i,t ; (22)
The model, then estimates equations in differences (22) and in levels (20), after demeaning, simul-
taneously under the following moment conditions (with Windmeijer correction)33:
E [yi,t−s∆i,t] = 0 for s ≥ 2; (23)
E [Wi,t−s∆i,t] = 0 for s ≥ 2; (24)
E [∆yi,t−s(µi + i,t)] = 0 for s = 1; (25)
E [∆Wi,t−s(µi + i,t)] = 0 for s = 1; (26)
Where lagged levels of explanatory variables are used as instruments in differenced equations, lagged
differences of them are used as instruments in level equations. The consistency of dynamic panel
GMM rests on the validity of the instruments and the assumption that the error terms do not
exhibit serial correlation.
We also use two specification tests. The first relates to instruments and includes Hansen-J test
of the joint validity of the instruments and Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument
subsets (null hypothesis that the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated
with the residuals). The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term is not second-order
serially correlated (by construction, the differenced error term is likely first-order serially correlated
33For detail description of the various GMM estimators, refer to Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover,
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Hansen, 1982; and Roodman (2009).
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even if the original is not).
II.5.1.2 Traditional system GMM
The traditional GMM, on the other hand, estimates growth equation (20) as a system of equations-
one per each country- with cross-equation restrictions imposed on our coefficients. The moment
condition of the model can be given as:
E[Zi,ti,t] = 0 , (27)
Where Zi,t represents a vector of our instruments. The GMM estimator, also known as Minimum
distance estimator, minimizes cross-products of the moment conditions, weighted by a positive
definite weighting matrix (preferably inverse of the covariance of the moments) and it corrects for
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in error terms.
In this model, we have instrumented bank credit (and private credit) by lags of liquid liability of
the banking system, turnover ratio (and traded value) by lags of stock market capitalization, and
the other controls by their respective lagged values, under the assumption that our instruments are
exogenous and relevant. The motivation for the choice of instruments for our financial measures is
as follows: both liquid liability of the banking system and the stock market capitalization measure
the overall sizes of the banking sector and stock market, respectively, and we assume the larger the
banking sector/ stock market, the better financial services- including credit service- it can render/
the more active and liquid the market becomes34. We then have tested both instrument exogeniety
(cov(Zi, i)=0) and relevance (cov(Zi,Wi) 6= 0) using both Hansen’s J test and Stock and Yogo’s
weak instrument test, respectively.
Econometric theory shows that, when dealing with small sample data the traditional GMM method
applied to a system of equations of homogeneous countries produces more efficient estimates than
panel GMM as it utilizes more information in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals, it iter-
34We also instrument the bank and stock market measures by their own respective lagged values and compare
results.
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ates the estimation procedure until our statistical estimates from successive steps converge, and
also corrects for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in error terms.
II.5.2 Empirical Evidence and Discussion
II.5.2.1 OLS regression results
As a benchmark regression we first estimate equation (20) using OLS and the results are given in
Table 7. Although OLS does not establish a causal relationship and suffers from endogeneity and
omitted variable bias, the regression results show that the correlation between financial develop-
ment and economic growth depends, at least partly, on the cluster group of countries included in
our regression.
II.5.2.2 GMM regression results
Both dynamic panel and traditional GMM regression results imply that stock markets and banking
system development have differential effects on economic growth of countries, depending on the
structural characteristics and stages of growth of countries involved. These results are robust to
the inclusion of more control variables and to the measurement of stock market and banking system
development using alternative indicators.
As Table 8 indicates, bank credit enters the full sample regression with either insignificant (panel
GMM) or negative and statistically significant (Traditional GMM) coefficients. The stock market
turnover ratio, however, enters the regressions (both models) with statistically significant positive
coefficients. The results remarkably differ, particularly for bank credits, when we apply our models
to the two income sub-groups, sorted following the World Bank’s Income Classification. The coef-
ficient of turnover ratio is positive and statistically significant in the regressions of both HIC and
MIC. The coefficient of bank credit, on the other hand, is negative and statistically significant in
the regressions of HICs, while it is robust and positive in the regressions of MICs.
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Similar results are found when alternative indicators of stock market and banking system are em-
ployed. As can be seen in Table 9, while private credit enters the full sample regression with either
insignificant (panel GMM) or negative and statistically significant (traditional GMM) coefficients,
the stock market traded value enters the regressions with positive and statistically significant coef-
ficients. In case of the two income sub-groups, the traded value enters regressions of both groups
with positive and robust coefficients. Private credit, however, enters HICs regressions with sta-
tistically significant negative coefficients and the MICs regressions with positive and statistically
significant coefficients.
The findings indicate that stock market liquidity considerably enhances economic growth of both
HICS and MICs. The size of credits issued to the private sector, nevertheless, either have no dis-
cernible effect or can even dampen growth of HICs, while they can boost growth of the MICs.
Although both dynamic panel system GMM and traditional GMM regressions produce consistent
estimates, econometric theory shows that the traditional GMM applied to a system of growth
equations of more homogeneous countries yields sharper and more efficient estimates (evident in
regression results) as it utilizes more information in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals,
iterates the estimation procedure until some sort of convergence is achieved, and also corrects for
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms.
Analysis of the growth impacts of stock markets and banking system development leads to more
meaningful outcomes when more homogeneous countries are involved. This is evident when we
apply our models to the four convergence clubs identified in the previous chapter.
The results in Table 10 depict that stock market turnover ratio enters regressions of both clubs of
HICs (Clubs 1&2) with positive and statistically significant coefficients. While coefficient estimate
of bank credits is positive and statistically significant for Club1, it is negative and statistically sig-
nificant for Club2. The table also shows that both turnover ratio and bank credits enter regressions
of both clubs of MIC (Clubs 3 & 4) with robust positive coefficients. Similar, albeit sharper, results
are obtained when traditional GMM is applied to the four clubs (Table 11).
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When we employ both dynamic panel GMM (Table 12) and traditional GMM (Table 13) to alterna-
tive measures of stock markets (traded value) and banking system (private credit) development, we
get very consistent outcomes. While the coefficient estimate of private credit is positive and strong
for Club1, it is negative and statistically significant in the case of Club2. The coefficient estimates
of traded value are positive and robust for both Clubs 1 & 2. For Clubs 3 & 4, both private credit
and traded value enter the regressions with statistically significant positive coefficients.
To what extent are the results influenced by the Great financial crisis that started in the beginning
of 2008? We run the regressions on data covering the period 1989-2007, excluding the post-crisis
period of 2008-2012. As Table 14 depicts, the results remain intact, implying that the outcomes
are not simply driven by the most recent financial crisis we experienced.
The results imply that while stock market liquidity plays a strong proactive role in promoting eco-
nomic growth of Clubs 1 & 2 members, the size of credit issued to the private sector significantly
boosts economic growth of Club1 member countries but can slow down growth of Club2 member
countries. For Clubs 3 & 4, financial development in general significantly boosts economic growth.
Club1 is dominated by European countries (5 out of 7), which are historically bank-based (i.e.,
primarily depend on banking system for financial services) and use strong monetary policy, in
the form of inflation-targeting regime. Of the other two members, Korea also pursues inflation-
targeting monetary policy- the country adopted inflation-targeting policy in 1998 and completed
its transition to a full-fledged regime in 2001 (IMF, 2005). As Rose (2014) argues, banks and bond
markets work best under inflation-targeting regimes and this may partially explain the results.
Club2 includes some of the most advanced economies that also boost the largest and most active
stock markets, including USA, Japan, Australia, and Great Britain. The finding that the size of
credits issued to the private sector can undermine economic growth of this group of countries is
in line with findings of recent panel studies, including Arcand et al. (2012) and Roussueau and
Wachtel (2011). Arcand et al. (2012) show that many advanced economies are characterized by
89
excess credit (over lending), which leads to slowdown in their economic growth. Rousseau and
Wachtel (2011) also show that since 1990’s the role of financial deepening in economic growth is
vanishing as a result of the frequent financial crises associated with it.
For Clubs 3 & 4, the robust growth effects of credits extended to the private sector and stock market
liquidity may give credence to the continued effort by policy makers to promote expansion of the
financial sector in developing countries as a way to accelerate economic growth. Rioja and Valev
(2004) also found that financial deepening positively and strongly influences economic growth at
intermediate level of financial development.
The coefficient estimates of lagged real income per capita (t-1) are all negative (between 0 and 1 in
absolute value) and statistically significant in all cases, indicating strong evidence of convergence
to each group’s long-run steady-state following temporary shocks.
In case of the control variables, while government size and inflation enter most of the regressions
with negative coefficients, trade openness assumes positive estimates. Schooling, surprisingly, en-
ters some of the regressions with negative coefficients35. In balance, the control variables enter the
regressions with insignificant coefficients.
The post-estimation tests support our conclusions. For dynamic panel GMM, the tests show that
there is no second-order serial correlation in the transformed error terms of differenced equation
and Hansen tests support validity of our instruments.
In case of traditional GMM, in addition to Hansen J stat (and p values) showing that there is no
over identification issue, Stock and Yogo tests of weak instruments (F-values) are greater than 10,
the rule-of-thumb, and Stock & Yogo’s critical values at 5% level, indicating rejection of the null
hypothesis of weak instruments.
35Schooling data is available only at five year intervals and does not show much variation.
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II.6 CONCLUSION
The study examined the possibly differential growth impacts of financial-both stock markets and
banking system-development for a sample of 40 countries during the period 1989-2012. It applied
both dynamic panel GMM and traditional GMM to a system of growth equations of four more
homogeneous income convergence clubs, identified using regression based club convergence test
suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007).
Regression results show that stock market liquidity plays a strong proactive role in promoting
economic growth of both clubs of HICs. The size of credit issued to the private sector, however,
significantly boosts economic growth of club1 members while it can slow down growth of club2
members. For the two clubs of MICs, financial development in general exerts a robust growth effect.
The results imply that stock markets and banking system development have differential growth
effects depending on structural characteristics and development status of countries. Hence, any
study that aims at providing an empirical support to the competing theories and furthering our
understanding of the finance-growth nexus is best served if focused on a more thorough examination
of either homogeneous countries or individual country cases.
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Table II.1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
All Countries (40)
Real GDP per capita 16830.96 17046.26 389.8133 87716.73
Economic growth 1.996 3.44 -18.045 26.5
Bank credit 69.345 47.537 6.96 223.834
Private credit 76.358 52.471 8.71 227.752
Liquid liabilities 74.221 54.927 8.622 399.114
Turnover ratio 60.423 63.373 0.145 497.402
Traded value 39.781 54.21 0.017 434.87
Mkt. Capitalization 60.735 53.447 2.218 328.876
Schooling 7.618 2.663 1.68 13.27
Govt. size 16.098 5.308 2.976 29.789
Inflation 34.546 325.232 -1.347 7481.664
Trade openness 79.436 65.831 13.753 444.1
Middle-income countries(21)
Real GDP per capita 2857.944 2052.762 389.813 8545.382
Economic growth 2.286 3.959 -18.045 26.501
Bank credit 41.355 30.249 6.958 165.719
Private credit 45.458 36.077 8.71 167.536
Liquid liabilities 51.239 29.512 8.622 130.419
Turnover ratio 40.861 58.137 0.406 497.402
Traded value 18.881 29.965 0.017 229.707
Mkt. Capitalization 47.454 52.305 2.218 328.876
Schooling 5.875 2.122 1.68 10.8
Govt. size 13.202 4.297 2.976 25.553
Inflation 63.252 447.13 -1.167 7481.664
Trade openness 67.414 39.811 13.753 220.407
High-income countries(19)
Real GDP per capita 32274.82 12348.1 8125.747 87716.73
Economic growth 1.676 2.722 -9.403 12.015
Bank credit 100.281 43.867 27.92 223.834
Private credit 110.512 46.232 27.938 227.753
Liquid liabilities 99.622 64.533 35.195 399.114
Turnover ratio 82.045 61.936 0.145 404.067
Traded value 62.881 64.675 0.209 434.871
Mkt. Capitalization 75.414 50.843 4.471 323.656
Schooling 9.544 1.698 5.07 13.27
Govt. size 19.299 4.406 8.211 29.788
Inflation 2.818 2.438 -1.347 20.404
Trade openness 92.724 83.935 15.924 444.1
Note: Except real GDP per capita and Schooling, all variables are expressed as percentage values.
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Table II.4. Bank & Stock market measures and economic growth, country Average, 1989-2012
Country Econ. Bank Private Liquid Turnover Traded Market
Growth Credit Credit Liab. ratio value cap.
Argentina* 2.548 17.547 17.937 25.516 21.092 3.17 25.698
Australia 1.671 90.998 90.998 69.34 64.436 60.593 89.969
Austria 1.476 104.186 104.588 91.126 50.682 9.975 20.769
Belgium 1.084 75.276 75.305 87.728 30.926 18.534 56.576
Brazil* 1.296 50.94 51.914 42.15 53.427 19.737 38.106
Cote daˆIvoire* -0.693 19.584 19.83 27.572 2.207 0.346 15.289
Colombia* 1.92 29.583 33.167 23.176 9.843 2.733 26.009
Denmark 1.084 115.65 115.772 60.73 65.102 35.255 52.198
Egypt* 2.646 39.312 39.312 79.607 26.644 11.593 33.077
Finland 1.493 74.068 74.378 56.656 77.741 73.508 83.571
France 1.103 94.395 94.451 67.702 75.415 73.508 63.008
Germany 1.541 105.985 105.985 90.919 121.222 45.919 39.077
Greece 0.892 61.031 61.132 75.839 47.56 23.222 40.743
Indonesia* 3.583 34.662 35.72 41.215 46.671 11.203 26.415
India* 4.502 32.895 32.895 53.807 99.636 42.007 46.898
Italy 0.666 79.138 79.397 64.266 98.439 33.282 31.19
Jamaica* 0.668 24.318 24.318 45.067 5.665 2.59 54.383
Jordan* 1.112 72.042 72.2 113.527 28.285 37.402 105.862
Japan 1.119 141.435 193.735 201.757 76.741 60.863 77.298
Korea 4.298 96.3 97.793 70.516 190.675 106.904 58.65
Luxembourg 2.31 125.1 125.155 321.274 1.375 1.951 148.529
Malaysia* 3.685 114.087 115.499 113.462 38.382 65.356 160.143
Mexico* 1.312 18.386 20.364 25.192 32.705 8.343 27.382
Morocco* 2.298 43.138 44.198 78.556 16.495 7.474 37.338
Netherlands 1.66 136.464 136.541 96.803 99.935 94.698 90.813
Nigeria* 2.955 15.898 15.994 21.905 8.198 1.65 14.264
Pakistan* 1.748 24.054 24.085 41.468 155.169 29.115 18.832
Peru* 2.208 19.091 19.932 25.103 15.641 3.403 31.248
Philippines* 1.845 32.049 32.071 51.546 23.48 12.051 52.792
Portugal 1.53 115.185 115.346 97.533 53.285 18.822 31.457
Singapore 3.636 95.56 95.565 114.514 59.651 91.571 161.809
South Africa* 0.792 65.879 127.163 47.992 32.591 58.907 169.639
Spain 1.539 122.401 122.511 97.888 125.417 88.949 62.843
Sri Lanka* 4.316 25.509 25.536 38.525 15.208 2.694 17.874
Sweden 1.59 80.056 109.266 53.648 85.082 82.992 90.306
Thailand* 3.956 109.667 115.99 95.037 83.633 43.815 58.676
Tunisia* 2.888 55.692 62.38 53.846 12.008 1.609 12.774
Turkey* 2.431 24.113 24.113 31.746 131.109 31.309 23.845
UK 1.672 141.47 141.827 109.762 88.741 110.154 125.937
United States 1.471 50.647 159.964 64.808 146.423 164.052 108.124
Note: * represents MIC, and the rest HIC.
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Table II.5. Unit-root test results
Full sample (40) HICs (19) MICs (21)
Variable CIPS IPS CIPS IPS CIPS IPS
Income per capita -1.461 -1.472 -1.544 -0.979 -1.47 -1.918
Bank credit -1.603 -1.665 -1.652 -1.634 -1.763 -1.693
Private credit -1.468 -1.675 -1.597 -1.624 -1.766 -1.722
Liquid liability -1.571 -1.792 -0.886 -1.669 -0.941 -1.903
Turnover ratio -1.384 -2.284 -1.45 -2.078 -1.955 -2.470**
Traded value -1.739 -1.781 -1.781 -1.444 -1.688 -2.085
Market capitalization -1.689 -2.466*** -1.887 -2.34 -1.541 -2.579**
Schooling -2.132* -4.132*** -2.288** -3.907*** -2.164** -4.335***
Govt consumption -1.253 -2.07 -0.847 -1.855 -1.188 -2.265
Inflation -1.936 -3.052*** -1.681 -3.040*** -2.07 -3.062***
Trade openness -1.53 -2.470*** -1.472 -2.475* -1.411 -2.466**
Critical values
-2.080 -2.330 -2.070 -2.410 -2.070 -2.390
(10%) (10%) (10%) (10%) (10%) (10%)
-2.160 -2.370 -2.150 -2.480 -2.150 -2.450
(5%) (5%) (5%) (5%) (5%) (5%)
-2.300 -2.450 -2.320 -2.620 -2.300 -2.580
(1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%)
Notes: All tests include intercept; maximum lag length is chosen based on general to particular method;
the null hypothesis is All panels contain unit roots, and the alternative is Some panels are stationary;
*,**,& *** represent rejection of the null hypothesis at 10,5,& 1%, respectively.
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Table II.6. Convergence club classification
Log t (t-stat) Income group of members (%)
HIC MIC
Panel A.Full sample[40] -3.210* (-12.017)
Club1 [22] 2.081 (8.100) 31.8 68.2
Club2 [18] 1.636 (8.321) 66.7 33.3
Log t (t-stat) Real GDP per capta,average
Panel B. HICs [19] -0.532* (-40.298) 32,276.82
Club1 [7] 2.023 (10.341) 32,146.93
Club2 [12] 1.139 (9.652) 32,349.42
Club1 [lower 3] + Club2 [upper 6] 0.001 (0.022)
Panel C. MICs [21] -0.479* (-18.629) 2,857.94
Club1 [12] 3.525 (9.647) 2,751.34
Club2 [9] 0.875 (6.135) 3,000.09
Club1 [lower 6] + Club2 [upper 4] -0.557* (-25.550)
Club1 includes Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Greece, Singapore, & Korea;
Club2 includes USA, Japan, Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium,
France,Austria, Spain, & Portugal;
Club1 of MICs( Club3 from now on) includes Mexico, Republic of South Africa, Brazil, Jamaica,
Peru, Tunisia, Jordan, Cote d’ivoire, Sri Lanka,Nigeria, Pakistan, & India;
Club2 of MICs (Club4 from now on) includes Turkey, Argentina, Malaysia, Columbia, Morocco,
Thailand, Philippines, Egypt, & Indonesia.
Notes: * represents rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level; Number of
club members is given in brackets and the t-statistics in parenthesis; countries are grouped into
High-income (HICs) are Middle-income (MICs) following the World Bank’s income classification.
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Table II.7. Stock markets, banks, and economic growth: OLS regression results
Dependent Variable: Per capita real GDP growth rate
Variable Full Sample HICs MICs Club1 Club2 Club3 Club4
Bank credit
-0.012*** -0.013** 0.001 -0.032*** -0.005 0.014 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011)
Turnover ratio
0.008*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.006 0.012*** 0.007** 0.015**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Income
-0.046*** -0.069*** -0.029* -0.06 -0.099*** -0.014 -0.187***
per capita,t-1 (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.047) (0.017) (0.020) (0.046)
Schooling
0.039** -0.025 0.025 -0.002 -0.039* 0.001 0.041***
(0.017) (0.033) (0.022) (0.102) (0.022) (0.023) (0.011)
Government
-0.01 -0.099*** -0.008 -0.066 -0.173*** -0.01 -0.024
size (0.013) (0.033) (0.015) (0.056) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022)
Inflation
-0.006 -0.25 -0.007 -0.307 -0.299** -0.003 -0.061**
(0.009) (0.165) (0.007) (0.215) (0.121) (0.008) (0.027)
Trade
0.019* 0.068*** 0.017 0.091*** 0.058*** 0.011 0.012
openness (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.034) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020)
Constant
0.014*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
No. Obs. 800 380 441 147 240 228 189
R2 0.105 0.265 0.103 0.211 0.466 0.127 0.206
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses; *,**,&*** represent significance levels at 10,5,&
1%, respectively; All variables are cross-sectionally demeaned and in log form.
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APPENDIX II.2 Figures for Chapter II
114
APPENDIX II.3 Club Convergence Algorithm
If the null hypothesis of full panel convergence is rejected, test for club convergence should be
applied using club convergence algorithm, as presented in Phillips and Sul (2007). The algorithm
has the following steps:
Step 1 (Ordering): Arrange the members of the panel in descending order according to the last
observation or a time series average of the final observations. This is because evidence of convergence
will, in general, be most apparent in the recent observations.
Step 2 (Core Group Formation): To form a core convergence group, select the first highest k
members (Step 1) for some 2 ≤ k < N , and run the log t regression and compute the convergence
t-statistic, tbˆ, for this subgroup. Among the N-2 estimated t-statistics (one for each k), focus on the
cases where tbˆ > -1.65 (so that convergence is certain for each subgroup) and choose the maximum
one. This ensures a low false inclusion rate.
Step 3 (Sieve Individuals for Club Membership): Add one country at a time to the core group
identified in Step 2 and calculate the convergence t-statistic from the log t regression. The new
country satisfies the membership if the associated t-statistic is greater than a chosen critical value
c∗,c∗ ≥ 0 (i.e.; tbˆ > c∗). All countries that satisfy the criterion are added to the core group. Then,
we run the log t test with this first subconvergence group (the core group plus the additionally
selected members) and make sure that tbˆ > -1.65. If not, raise the critical value, c
∗, to increase
the discriminatory power of the log t test and repeat this step until tbˆ > -1.65 with the first
subconvergence group.
Step 4 (Recursive and Stopping Rule): For a group of countries not selected in Step 3, run the log t
and see if tbˆ > -1.65 and this cluster forms a second convergence club. If so, we conclude that there
are two convergent subgroups in the panel. If not, repeat Steps 1-3 on this subgroup to determine
if there are smaller subconvergence clusters. If no core group can be found (Step 2), conclude that
the remaining countries diverge.
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